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WORKPLACE HARASSMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR
A BRIGHT LINE TEST CONSISTENT WITH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
DebraD. Burke*

I. INTRODUCTION

The law of sexual harassment under Title VII of The Civil Rights
Act of 19641 has developed substantially over the last twenty years. The
statute has been used to prohibit harassment as a form of discrimination
if it is based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Some
courts also recognize harassment-based discrimination under other statutes as well, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 2 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 3 The rate of sexual harassment
complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission4
remained virtually constant at around 15,000 from 1995 through 1999.
However, the number of sexual harassment charges filed with the agency
and its state counterparts more than doubled from 6,883 in 1991 to 15,618
in 1998, while the number of racial harassment filings shot from 4,910 to
9,908 over the same period.5 Also increasing is the number of all types of
* Professor of Business Law, Western Carolina University. B.A. 1977, University of Texas
at Austin; J.D. 1982, University of Texas School of Law; and, M.P.A 1982, Lyndon B. Johnson
School of Public Affairs. The author is the former Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Legal Studies in
Business and presently serves as an Articles Editor for the publication. The author gratefully acknowledges the support and insight provided by the participants of the 2003 Huber Hurst Seminar
and the University of Florida.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
4. Larry Keller, Sexual Harassment:Serious, Subtle, Stubborn, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/CAREER/trends/10/03/harassment/index.html (Oct. 3, 2000). The settlement figure, however, more than doubled over the same period from $24.3 million to $50.3 million. Id.
5. Ida L. Castro, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC, at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (June 18,

1999).
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harassment complaints in which the agency concluded there was "no
reasonable cause to support the charges," up from 30.4% in 1995 to
44.0% in 1999.6
While workplace harassment cases are playing a more and more
prominent role in employment regulation, women and minorities are still
disproportionately excluded from high paying jobs and positions of
power in corporate America. With a few noteworthy exceptions, CEOs
and CFOs of large corporations are white males.7 Further, a report based
upon the 2000 Census concluded that women are less likely than men to
reach the highest salary brackets.8 While working in an environment free
from harassment is certainly desirable from an equality point of view,
harassment is but one facet of employment discrimination--one which is
arguably over-emphasized to the exclusion of achieving more important
reforms as well as to the potential sacrifice of some First Amendment
values. It would seem predictable that as more women and minorities
occupy positions of real power in workplaces, the less likely it will be
that harassment targeted at women and minorities will be problematicthe preferable route to the eradication of hostile working environments is
to achieve this result. But alas, employment discrimination laws of late
seem to have lost sight of the forest for the trees not only by perpetuating
the glass ceiling, but also at the expense of the Constitution.
This article will first examine how harassment has been defined as
a form of discrimination and conclude that further clarity is needed. It
will then scrutinize First Amendment issues raised with the suppression
6. Keller, supra note 4 (internal quotations omitted). One of the functions of the EEOC is to
weed out claims that are not meritorious. For a review of the EEOC's work with respect to its charging and litigation efforts, see generally Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the
Agency's Role in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1996).
7. It was not until 1998 that an African-American male became CEO of a Fortune 500 company (Fannie Mae). Roy Johnson, The 500's First Black CEO, FORTUNE, May 11, 1998, at 32.
"Since 1999, three black men have ascended to become CEOs of FORTUNE 50 companies." Cora
Daniels, The Most Powerful Black Executives in America, FORTUNE, July 8, 2002, at 60, 63. Similarly, minorities are extremely under-represented on corporate boards. Gary Strauss, Good Old
Boys' Network Still Rules Corporate Boards; Ethnic Members Scarse, and Gains Happen Slowly,
USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at 1B, available at http://www.mqc.com/glass-usatoday.html. African
Americans and Hispanics combined hold less than five percent of the 11,500 Fortune 1,000 board
seats while women hold roughly fourteen percent. Id.
8. "Of the population 15 and over who were full-time, year-round workers, 6 percent of
women earned $75,000 or more, compared with 16 percent of men." Press Release, United States
Department of Commerce News, U.S. Census Bureau, Women Closing the Gap with Men in Some
Measures, According to Census Bureau (Mar. 24, 2003) available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/women/000819.html. Men hold eighty-eight percent of the senior
jobs in corporate America. Patricia Sellers, The 50 Most Powerful Women in Business: Secrets of
the FastestRising Stars, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 2000, at 130, 147.
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of verbal abuse as an alleged form of invidious disparate treatment and
argue that only speech coupled with conduct can be regulated under federal civil rights law. Finally, the article will survey non-sexual harassment under a bright-line test for unlawful discrimination, which requires
overt conduct as a mandatory element, to determine if such cases could
result in employer liability.
II.

THE LAW OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT

A. Backgroundon Civil Rights Statutes
Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits discrimination in the private sector based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9 More specifically, the Act provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.l°

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 "l further enhanced the remedies available for acts of intentional employment discrimination by permitting the

9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The Act covers employers whose business affects interstate
commerce and who employ fifteen or more persons for twenty or more weeks a year. Id. § 2000e(b).
Sex, as a forbidden criterion for employment decisions, was actually included in an attempt to defeat the legislation. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). A homosexual who is discharged because of his or her gender can
sue under Title VII; however, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based upon homosexuality.
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). While no federal civil rights
law as yet prohibits private employers from discriminating based upon sexual orientation, some state
laws do prohibit such discrimination. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a -81c (1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 15 lb, § 4 (1996).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). For an overview of additional remedies provided for by the legislation, including a trial by jury and an enhanced damage system, see M. Isabel Medina, A Matter
of Fact:Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311,
318-30 (1999).
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recovery of punitive damages 12 for acts done with malice or reckless indifference to federally-protected rights.' 3
Proof that an employer illegally discriminated against an employee's Title VII protected class can be established under either one of
two theories of recovery: disparate treatment or disparate impact.' 4 For a
prima facie discrimination case based upon disparate treatment, generally the employee must allege and prove by circumstantial evidence that
1) s/he was a member of a protected class, 2) s/he suffered an unfavorable or adverse employment decision, 3) s/he was qualified to assume or
retain the position, and 4) the employer did not treat race, gender, national origin, age, or disability neutrally in making the decision. 15 In a
discrimination case involving disparate treatment, direct proof of discriminatory motive is usually critical to establishing the prima facie case unless
it can be inferred given the circumstances. 16
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination,' 7 the plaintiff may
inferentially establish his case by circumstantial evidence according to a
three stage, burden-shifting paradigm.' 8 After the plaintiff-employee meets
his prima facie burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendantemployer to show that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision and that only legitimate factors motivated the
employer's decision.' 9 If the employer fails to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action after the plaintiff-employee
has established his prima facie case according to the trier of fact, then the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff.20 Alternatively, if the employer
articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive, 2 ' then the burden shifts
12. Arguably, the increase in the number of civil rights complaints filed with the EEOC in the
1990s was the product of this legislation and its provision for exemplary damages. See Theresa M.
Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71,
120-21 (1999).
13. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (holding that an employer's conduct did not need to be independently egregious to merit an award of punitive damages, although
such egregious or outrageous conduct could provide evidence from which to infer an evil motive).
14. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.1 5 (1977).
15. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the general test for plaintiff's initial burden in a racial discrimination case under Title VII).
16. Int'lBhd.of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
17. Under the direct evidence approach, a plaintiff carries the initial burden by showing that
the employment decision was based solely or in part upon illegal criteria. Oates v. Discovery Zone,
116 F.3d 1161, 1170 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Randle v. LaSalle Telecomm., Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568
(7th Cir. 1989)).
18. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 254.
21. An unjustified refusal to work is an example of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
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back the employee to prove that the alleged nondiscriminatory justification
22
was merely a pretext for discrimination. Under a disparate impact theory,
the plaintiff may establish that seemingly neutral criteria used by an employer is, nevertheless, an invidious form of discrimination because it disproportionately impacts persons who are protected under the legislation.23
Other acts of Congress complement Title VII and further prohibit discrimination based upon age or disability. Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 24 in 1967 as part of a scheme to
eliminate invidious bias in employment decisions, including those related
to hiring, promotion, compensation, and terms and conditions of employment. 25 The ADEA makes it unlawful for a covered employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age; or (3) to reduce
26 the wage
chapter.
this
with
comply
to
order
in
employee
any
of
rate

The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 27 passed in 1990, protects handicapped individuals, who are otherwise qualified workers, from

termination. Thompson v. Price Broad. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
22. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 248. This burden-shifting method of proving discrimination may be applicable to claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as well.
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Group, 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (assuming that the Title VII
framework is applicable to the ADEA).
23. For example, the EEOC Guidelines suggest that an "English only" rule in a workplace can
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, subject to the employer's rebuttal that there is business justification for the rule. 29 C.F.R § 1606.7(a), (b) (2000). The theories of disparate treatment
and disparate impact discrimination, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Cheryl
Anderson, "Thinking Within the Box": How Proof Models Are Used to Limit the Scope of Sexual
HarassmentLaw, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 125, 166 (2001).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). The Act covers nonfederal employers "affecting commerce" which employ at least twenty non-seasonal employees, labor unions with at least twentyfive members or which operate as a hiring hall, employment agencies, state and local government
employees in non-policy making positions and federal employees in certain sectors. Id. § 630. It
covers employees over forty years old and also expressly prohibits discrimination with regard to
benefits. Id. §§ 623(a), 63 1(a).
25. Congress passed the statute in an effort to eradicate arbitrary and stigmatizing stereotypes
about the lower performance level of older workers in favor of assessments based upon ability. EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 230-31 (1983).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(l)-(3).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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employment discrimination. 28 The ADA defines the term "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual hold or desires," with consideration being given to the employer's judgment as to what job functions are
essential.2 9 In other words, a qualified individual must be able to satisfy the
prerequisites for the position, such as proper training, skills, and experience, in addition to possessing the ability to perform the essential function
of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation.3 ° Unlike the
other civil rights laws, the ADA imposes an obligation on employers not
only to refrain from discrimination, but also to act affirmatively in appropriate circumstances to make a reasonable accommodation.
B. Workplace Harassment:An Overview
Harassment can be a form of discrimination under Title VII. 3 1 While
the first cases to articulate such a proposition involved national origin and
racial harassment, 32 sexual harassment cases 33 have primarily been responsible for developing the law in this area. 34 The standards for judging hos28. Id. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(B).
29. Id.§ 12111(8).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2003).
3 1. For a doctrinal discussion as to why harassment can be considered a form of disparate
treatment, see generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J.
1683, 1714-16 (1998).
32. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that employer's segregation of Hispanic clientele could create an offensive work environment for Hispanic employees);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989) (stating that "[riacial harassment in
the course of employment is actionable under Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in the
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."').
33. The EEOC has defined sexual harassment as:
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature.., when (1)submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2003). The Supreme Court has held that Title VII covers same-sex discrimination including same-sex sexual harassment, and that the "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
34. One of the first scholars to advocate the recognition of sexual harassment as a form of
actionable discrimination was Professor MacKinnon. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
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tility are sufficiently demanding so as to filter out ordinary tribulations
in the work place, such as abusive language, in an effort to assure that
Title VII does not become a "general civility code., 35 The Supreme
Court has held that actionable sexual harassment must be sufficiently severe and pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and to
create an abusive environment judged from the totality of the circumstances. 36 In hostile working environment cases, the "objective severity
of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable37
person in the plaintiffs position, considering 'all the circumstances.'
Courts must consider the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. 3 8 Further, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that illegal harassment must create a hostile environment that is
both objectively and subjectively offensive. 39 It is not necessary for an
employee to prove that the offensive conduct has been psychologically injurious before the situation is actionable.40 Conduct which forms the basis
of the complaint, however, must be unwelcome.41
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (defining and explaining quid pro quo and hostile environment cases). The D.C. Circuit was a pioneer in developing
the early law in this area. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections
on the Development of Sexual HarassmentLaw, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 813 (2002). For the early, now
landmark, cases on sexual harassment, see generally Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976), vacatedsub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
35. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
36. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
37. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
38. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The EEOC guidelines state that in sexual harassment cases the trier of
fact should look at .'the record as a whole' and 'the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of
the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred."' Meritor Say. Bank, 477
U.S. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (1985)). The guidelines describe hostile environment harassment as conduct which .'has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."' Id at 65
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (1985). These guidelines, while not controlling on courts, "constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
39. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
40. Id. at 22.
41. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60-61. Voluntary participation in sexual conduct does not
necessarily mean that the overtures are welcome. Id. at 68. However, an employee's enthusiastic acquiescence of the conduct, which later forms the basis of the complaint, mitigates against employer liability. Hansen v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 669, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Query to
what extent a plaintiff's past sexual conduct is relevant in determining whether the questionable
conduct is unwelcome. See Lisa Dowlen Linton, The Louis Jackson National Student Writing Competition: PastSexual Conduct in Sexual Harassment Cases, 75 CM.-KENT L. REV. 179 (1999) (discussing
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Since Title VII does not create a cause of action against the harasser,42
the issue of the employer's responsibility is critical to a plaintiff. Two 1998
Supreme Court decisions addressed that issue.43 In Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth,4 the Supreme Court held that
when a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted
from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she
establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in
the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title
VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision
45 to
be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe and pervasive.
The Court characterized a tangible employment action as one which
constitutes "a significant change in employment status, such as the hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different respon' 6
sibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.A

admissibility of plaintiff's past sexual conduct in a sexual harassment case under the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
42. Parsons v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 465, 468 (M.D. Fla. 1995). For an argument that liability should lie in tort against the actual perpetrators, not the employer, see Mark
McLaughlin Hager, Harassmentas a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed,30 CONN. L. REv. 375, 376-77 (1998).
43. For a discussion of these cases and their potential ramifications, see generally Kerri Lynn
Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlorto Boar in a Boardroom: Why Ellerth Isn't Working and How
Other Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize the Sexual Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 303 (1999); Paul Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understandingof Workplace Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
Title VII, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 55 (1999); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REv. 671 (2000); Vicki J. Limas, Significant
Employment Law Decisions in the 1997-98 Term: A Clarification of Sexual Harassment Law and a
Broad Definition ofDisability, 34 TULSA L.J. 307 (1999).
44. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
45. Id. at 753-54.
46. Id. at 761. The Court reasoned that such decisions by their very nature ensure that the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relationship between the company and the supervisor. Id. at 762. Since tangible employment actions require an official act of the enterprise, such
actions taken by the supervisor become the actions of the employer under Title VII. Id.Courts are
still grappling with this definition. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding that the confiscation of a teacher's art supplies, which were necessary for her to perform her
assigned tasks, coupled with a negative evaluation, which was subsequently reversed six months later,
could constitute a tangible employment action); Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 46162 (6th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that there is a de minimis exception for either temporary actions or nonmaterially adverse actions; for example, those with no economic loss); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446,
457 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that a lateral transfer, in which there is no diminution in pay or benefits,
cannot reasonably be viewed as causing objective tangible harm absent some other materially adverse
consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities).
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In both Ellerth and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,4 7 the Supreme
Court announced the following holding: "An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority
over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages ....
,48 This affirmative defense requires the employer to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that 1) reasonable care was exercised to
prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior and 2) the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities the employer provided.49 Commensurately, the
Court asserted that there is no affirmative defense available in cases where
the employer's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action"
Presumably, employer liability for co-worker harassment was unchanged
by the decisions, and an employer will still be liable for the actions of a coworker if the employer either knew or should have known of the misconduct, unless the employer can prove that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action.51
In announcing this framework for evaluating employer liability, the
Court de-emphasized what had once been a critical distinction in sexual
47. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
48. Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. For a discussion of the affirmative defenses, see Steven D. Baderian, Elise M. Bloom, & Valerie K. Wilde, ManagingEmployment Risks in Light of the
New Rulings in Sexual HarassmentLaw,21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343 (1999) (evaluating potential
employer responses); Allan H. Weitzman, Employer Defenses to Sexual Harassment Claims, 6
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 27 (1999).
49. The Court surmised in Faragherthat "[w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of
law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense." Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
The Court also highlighted the need for a well-publicized complaint-reporting system with respect
to the second prong of the affirmative defense, which focuses on the reasonableness of the employee's conduct in failing to report. Id. at 806-07.
And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.
Id. at 807-08.
50. Id. at 808.
51. The standard remains one of negligence. See Castro, supra note 5. Therefore, the plaintiff
in such cases must establish that he or she was subject to unwelcome harassment based upon sex which
"affected a term, condition or privilege of employment," and "that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action." Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181
F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 561 (6th Cir.
1999) (applying the "knew or should have known" standard).
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harassment cases: the difference in quid pro quo5 2 and hostile environment
cases.53 The Court explained that the terms, while still helpful in distinguishing cases in which a supervisor carries out a threat to sanction an employee who refuses to submit to sexual demands from cases where the
threat does not materialize, should no longer define employer responsibility. 54 Although the law of workplace harassment has been addressed by the
Court over the last twenty years, it still remains intolerably unclear. Courts
in different jurisdictions continue to look at similar circumstances and
reach opposite results as to employer liability while issues continue to surface that seemingly raise more questions than have ever been sufficiently
answered by the high court.
C. What Really is Actionable Harassment?
One such question concerns how to judge the combined subjective
and objective circumstances of the severity of the harassment. Although
the severity and pervasiveness of the environment must be viewed from55
"the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position,"
some courts are still influenced by what the Ninth Circuit views to be the
reasonable woman standard in cases of sexual harassment.56 This standard,

52. Such discrimination can embrace situations in which job opportunities, promotions, merit pay
increases, and the like are given out in exchange for sexual favors or when a person is terminated, demoted, or otherwise adversely treated for refusing sexual overtures. See generally Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
53. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751-54. For a critique of the classification of the two types of discriminatory conduct, see Eugene Scalia, The Strange Careerof Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307 (1998).See also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-09
(11 th Cir. 1982) (articulating the elements of both cases).
54. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
55. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
56. The Ninth Circuit recognizes a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment
when conduct is what "a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment." Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). Most of the federal circuit courts implicitly approve of womenspecific standards for hostile environment cases. Michael J.Frank, The Social Context Variable in
Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437,456 n.96 (2002). Plaintiffs tend to have a
higher success rate when courts mention such a standard. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The
Sweep of Sexual HarassmentCases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 555 (2001).
For a discussion of the reasonable woman standard after the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Robert S.
Adler & Ellen R. Pierce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman"
Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1993); Paul B. Johnson, The
Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law. Progressor Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
619 (1993); Robert Unikel, Comment, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman
Standardin American Jurisprudence,87 NW. U. L. REV. 326 (1992).
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even if employed, produces different results among reasonable women.57
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") suggests that
the employee-plaintiff's race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age,
or disability should be considered in defining hostile environment. 58 In
some cases, the plaintiffs may claim harassment on two grounds; for example, race and sex. Should those claims then apply some combined standard embracing both gender and race?59 Should the discriminatory acts be
aggregated in order to establish the totality of circumstances? 60 Query what
place reason and reasonableness have in the determination of hostile working environments. 6 1
There also appears to be no golden thread as to how severe is severe,
how abusive is abusive, and how pervasive is pervasive.62 The Court has
observed that Title VII is not limited to such conduct "that would seriously
affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being,, 63 but it does not
specify what less injurious words or actions will suffice. 64 Only one thing
57. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, Ill HARV. L. REv. 445,
472-74 (1997) (relating the differing views among female attorneys as to the severity of the harassment in the Ninth Circuit case that announced the reasonable woman standard).
58. Castro, supranote 5.
59. For a discussion of the reasonable minority woman standard, see Tam B. Tran, Comment,
Title VII Hostile Work Environment: A Different Perspective, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357
(1998) (evaluating such a standard). See also Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and RacialHarassmentLitigation, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95,
119 (1992) (remarking that the convergence of race and sex discrimination often makes the two indistinguishable); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1467, 1472 (1992) (arguing that "intersections of racism and sexism must be acknowledged").
60. Some courts permit such an aggregation. See, e.g., Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 51415 (6th Cir. 1999) (race and religion); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th
Cir. 1987) (race and sex); Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-33
(5th Cir. 1980) (race and sex). But see Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1356 (11 th Cir. 1997)
(affirming district court's decision that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury instruction that required
jurors to consider race and gender from the victim's perspective). For a critique. of Watkins, see
Sarah McLean, Comment, Harassmentin the Worlplace: When Will the Reactions of Ethnic Minorities
and Women Be ConsideredReasonable?,40 WASHBURN L.J. 593,594-95 (2001).
61. See Bernstein, supra note 57, at 482-524 (arguing for a "respectful person" standard as an
alternative to the "reasonable person" standard in sex discrimination cases).
62. For a review of sexual harassment cases and the issue of what circumstances are actionable, see Jeffrey M. Lipman & Hugh J. Cain, Evolution in Hostile Environment Claims Since Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 47 DRAKE L. REv. 585 (1999); Susan Weber Wright, Emroch Lecture: Uncertainties in the Law of Sexual Harassment,33 U. RICH. L. REv. 11 (1999).
63. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). In Harris,the Court was responding
to the tendency of lower courts to require proof of such harm before the plaintiff could succeed in
hostile environment cases. Id.; see also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir.
1986) (stating that "an offensive work environment could... constitute Title VII sexual harassment
without the necessity of asserting or proving tangible job detriment by the harassed employee...").
64. Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous court in Harris,acknowledged that the test of
actionable discrimination in hostile environment cases "is not, and by its nature cannot be, a
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seems to be vaguely certain: an isolated incident is not enough65 unless it is
serious. 66 The line that ultimately must be drawn is between
"extremely
'67
"merely
and "deeply '68 offensive conduct given the totality of the circumstances: a standard one state judge characterized as being more
"analogous to corrosion than explosion., 69 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that calling a subordinate a "pretty girl," making "urn, um,urn"
sounds when she wore a leather skirt, and commenting about how "hot" his
71
70
office became when she entered were not to be considered harassment.
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit held that a supervisor's habit of following
the plaintiff around, looking at her groin and making a sniffing motion was
not actionable.72 Yet actionable harassment existed when six offensive
mathematically precise test." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Justice Scalia voiced the same concern in his
concurring opinion, stating that "'(a]busive' (or 'hostile,' which in this context I take to mean the
same thing) does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all increased
by adding the adverb 'objectively' or by appealing to a 'reasonable person['s]' notion of what the
vague word means." Id. at 24.
65. Recently, the Supreme Court determined that a single incident of allegedly lewd joking
could not alter the terms and conditions of employment required for a Title VII violation. Clark
County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). The single incident involved a supervisor,
during a joint review of job applicants, reading a report that an applicant had once told a co-worker
that making love to her was like making love to the Grand Canyon. Id at 269. A male employee
told the supervisor, who claimed not to understand the remark, that he would explain later; both
men then chuckled. Id.; see also Bennett v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corrs., 705 F. Supp. 979, 983
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting only a single incident of racial harassment).
66. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). "[E]ven a single incident of
sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim's employment and clearly creates an
abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII liability." Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295,
1305 (2d Cir. 1995) (dealing with verbal harassment culminating in sexual assault). Single incident
cases are "highly unusual." Juliano & Schwab, supra note 56, at 567.
67. See, e.g., Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 1998) (merely
offensive); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (merely offensive);
Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1994) (merely unpleasant); see also
Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997) (vulgar and boorish).
68. See Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir.
1994) (determining that words and deeds "crossed the line that separates the merely vulgar and
mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and sexually harassing").
69. Clifton v. Mass. Bay Trans. Auth., No. 95-2686-H, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 22, at *15
(Feb. 3, 2000).
70. Baskerville,50 F.3d at 430.
71. Id. at 43 1. The court characterized Title VII as being designed to protect women from
behavior that makes the workplace hellish, but not to rid the workplace of vulgarity. Id. at 430; see
also Russell v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of I11.
at Chi., 243 F.3d 336, 343 (7th Cir. 2001) (calling staff of
three women the "staff from hell," referring to each as a "bitch" and that stating one of them
"dressed sleazy and like a whore" does not constitute harassment directed at the plaintiff). One
commentator has suggested that the Seventh Circuit restricts hostile environment sexual harassment
to those situations that involve sexual conduct directed at employees out of sexual desire. Anderson,
supra note 23, at 127.
72. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11 th Cir. 1999). For a thorough summary
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comments were made to the plaintiff by her supervisor, stating, for example, that he hoped she would "get a little this weekend" so she would come
back to work in a better mood, and that she had to be "a sad piece of ass" if
she could not keep a man.73 In other words, often the line between the legal
and the illegal can seem to be a hazy one; a court can make the novel determination that sniffing sounds directed at the plaintiff's groin are not
threatening or humiliating based upon a single, unremarkable case involving a joke told in the plaintiffs presence about a prophylactic, which did
not involve the plaintiffs genitalia.74
Further, consider a naturally abusive environment, such as the bluecollar job site. Should courts employ a "coarseness factor" in whether the
environm ent is sufficiently hostile? 75 To what extent should other contextspecific aspects of the workplace culture, such as the social relationship between the harasser and the plaintiff or whether the conduct took place in a
public or private setting, be considered in examining the totality of the circumstances? 76 What of silence and inaction? One state court has suggested
that giving someone the cold shoulder treatment can be actionable.7 7 How
should "associational" harassment claims be judged, where co-workers exbased upon their association with
perience hostile working environments
78
classes?
protected
of
members
of cases examining the relative severity and pervasiveness of the hostility, see id at 1246-47; Dun-

can v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 934-35 (8th Cir. 2002).
73. Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1414-15 (10th Cir. 1997); see
also Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 771, 774-76 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that repeated

actions of rubbing up against an employee, telling off-color jokes and commenting suggestively about an
employee's appearance survived the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment).
74.

Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1260-61 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J., con-

curring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 309 (5th Cir.
1996)). Judge Tjoflat characterized the defendant's conduct in Mendoza as being like "some beast
see also Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
marking its prey." Id.;

that disturbing noises and physical contact, which intimidated the plaintiff and made it difficult for
her to perform her job, were sufficient to conclude that there was hostile conduct).
75. See Rebecca Brannan, Note, When the Pig Is in the Barnyard,Not the Parlor:Should Courts
Apply a "CoarsenessFactor" in Analyzing Blue-CollarHostile Work Environment Claims?, 17 GA. ST.

U. L. REv. 789 (2001) (arguing that employing such a mitigating factor would undermine the remedial goals of Title VII).
76. The Court in Oncale instructed courts to examine the "social context" in evaluating hos-

tile environment in same-sex harassment cases. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 81 (1998). For a discussion of this imperative, see Frank, supranote 56.
77.

Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tenn. 1996). Even though the employer

was not legally responsible, the court described the treatment by the plaintiff's co-workers as being
"appalling" and "totally and completely reprehensible." Id. at 36.

78.

For an overview of such claims, see David B. Hawley, Note, "Standing" Up for Minority

Coworkers? White Males Do Not Have "Aggrieved Person" Standingfor Hostile Environment Actions

Under Childress v. City of Richmond, 77 N.C. L. REv. 865 (1999).See also Drake v. Minn.Mining &
Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting an associational discrimination claim).
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Not only is the line between the permissible and the impermissible a
difficult one to draw consistently across contexts and jurisdictions, 79 but
who is responsible for making the call is also debatable. While some appeals courts conclude that whether an alleged hostile environment is sufficiently severe and pervasive to be actionable is a question of law, others
allow the resolution to be made by the trier of fact. 80 This question is critical for determining whether summary judgments should be granted. In
sum, the allegedly objective standard for determining whether there has
been unlawful discrimination on the basis of illegal criteria is intolerably
subjective, 2 reminiscent of another context when Justice Stewart penned

his famous phrase for defining obscenity under federal law: "But I know it
when I see it.

,83

79. This lack of uniformity among hostile environment standards is particularly burdensome
for employers who operate across jurisdictional lines. Frank, supranote 56, at 495 n.282.
80. For a discussion of this issue, see Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don 't Get It: Hostile Work EnvironmentLitigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277 (1999).
81. Compare Beiner, supra note 12, at 75 (arguing that summary judgment is inappropriate in
most harassment cases since the issue is fact-specific and juries should determine what would be
offensive to a reasonable person), with Shim A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries,and Sexual
Harassment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 813, 814-15 (1999) (arguing that summary judgment should
not be a disfavored way of resolving harassment claims since Title VII's proper interpretation is at
stake). See generally Medina, supra note 11 (arguing that juries should define appropriate workplace norms). Given the substantial amount of litigation concerning workplace harassment and the
costs to defend such suits, it is imperative that employers be able to rely on the predictable shield of
summary judgment. Robert J. Aalberts & Lome Seidman, Seeking a "Safe Harbor": The Viability
of Summary Judgment in Post-HarrisSexual HarassmentLitigation, 20 S.ILL. U. L.J. 223, 227-32
(1996).
82. See Frank, supra note 56, at 493 ("[Jludges and scholars from various political persuasions who frequently agree on little else agree that the present standard of judging hostile environment harassment suffers from an intolerable vagueness."); Lipman & Cain, supra note 62, at 596
("'Pervasiveness' becomes a very subjective element based on the jury or court's own personal experiences."); Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 81, at 835 ("Neither judges, juries, litigants, employees, employers, nor the public at large have definitive guidance as to where the line between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior is, or should be, drawn."); Shannon McAuliffe, Note, Speak
No Evil: The First Amendment Offers No Protectionfor Sexual Harassers,29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
233, 245 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court has failed to identify how to determine the sufficiency of severity and pervasiveness); Richard Allen Olmstead, Comment, In Defense of the Indefensible: Title VII Hostile Environment Claims UnconstitutionallyRestrict Free Speech, 27 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 691, 699 (2001) (arguing that hostile environment harassment law offers little guidance to finders of fact and law).
83. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). At the time Justice Stewart wrote, the standard for determining obscenity made the Supreme Court the authority as to what specific speech
was properly criminal and what was protected speech, with each Justice employing his own standard. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam).
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III. CONDITIONS AND CONDUCT V. WORDS:
THE REQUISITE BRIGHT LINE

A. Words
Risk-averse employers' natural reaction to the vague limits of hostile environment is to over-compensate by prohibiting words or conduct
84
in the workplace that even come close to bordering on harassment.
This reaction could have an adverse effect on protected expression in the
workplace. 85 For this reason, it is particularly troubling when courts recognize that words can be primarily responsible for creating a hostile
working environment.86
Several courts seem willing to permit verbal expression, particularly derogatory epithets and foul language, to state a claim for harassment under federal law. 87 For example, in the context of racial
harassment, a state court held that the use of a single racist comment by
a supervisor could constitute harassment.88 Moreover, the California Su84. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" HarassmentLaw Restrict?,
85 GEO. L.J. 627, 636 (1997). Even the EEOC suggests that "[plrevention is the best tool for the elimination
of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment
(2003).
occurring ....29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)
fi'om
85. For a discussion of First Amendment issues with respect to the law of workplace harassment, see infra Part IV.
86. For a comprehensive analysis of cases involving verbal harassment, see Jamie Lynn Cook,
Comment, Bitch v. Whore: The Current Trend to Define the Requirements of an Actionable Hostile Environment Claim in Verbal Sexual Harassment Cases, 33 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 465 (2000). The author
finds that courts evaluate the merits of verbal harassment cases by three tests- the gender relation test, the
sexual nature test, and the personal animosity test- which results in the dismissal of many meritorious
at 466.
claims. Id.
87. In some cases, employers have been found liable for retaliating against employees in response to their complaints about an environment permeated with racial or religious slurs. See
Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding employer liable where
plaintiff was fired after requesting a transfer because he was the subject of racial slurs); Weiss v.
United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (finding the employer intentionally retaliated against the plaintiff after he objected to the offensive religious slurs used against him). For a
discussion of several cases involving the suppression of speech under the law of workplace harassment, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, and Harassment Law, 2001 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3 (2001).

88. Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 699 (N.J. 1998) (stating that "a jury could reasonably
find that defendant's conduct [in calling the plaintiff a "jungle bunny"] would have a devastating
effect on the average African American"). But see McPhaul v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Madison County,
226 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that racially sensitive and derogatory remarks made in
plaintiff's presence but not directed at plaintiff are not actionable); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,
646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring a "steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment" as
opposed to an infrequent use of racial slurs); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
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preme Court in Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.89 affirmed a

judgment granting an injunction that prevented the use of any "derogaat, or descriptive of, History racial or ethnic epithets directed
90
Avis...."
of
employees
panic/Latino
In the context of sex discrimination, the Ninth Circuit concluded in
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.9' that a plaintiff established a prima
facie hostile environment case based upon her supervisor's repeated use
of derogatory terms directed at her, such as "dumb fucking broad,"
"cunt," and "fucking cunt. ' '92 Likewise, in Burns v. McGregorElectronic

Industries,9 3 harassment was found based upon the use of words such as
"bitch," "asshole," "slut," and "cunt." 94 Similarly, exhibitions of pornography in some jurisdictions will be deemed culpable for creating a sufficiently hostile working environment.9 5 In Robinson v. Jacksonville
(holding that the "mere utterance of an... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a[n] employee" is not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
89. 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999).
90. Id. at 850. The words the employee had used allegedly included the term "motherfuckers"
in addition to other demeaning criticisms of complainant's race, national origin and lack of English
language skills. Id. at 849. For an evaluation of the case and its potential ramifications, see Charles
R. Calleros, Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.: The California Supreme Court Takes a Divided
Freeway to Content-OrientedRegulation of Workplace Speech, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 237 (2000) (arguing
that the effect of Aguilar as precedent should be limited to content neutral theory of employment dis'
crimination); Jennie Randall, Comment, "'Don'tYou Say That! ": Injunctions Against Speech Found to
Violate Title VlAre Not PriorRestraints, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 990 (2001) (arguing that the injunction
against speech found to violate Title VII is not a prior restraint as applied to the facts of the case).
In an earlier case, Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986), the court, without discussion, upheld an injunction which required the warden in a correctional facility "to forbid the use of
racial epithets; the posting or distribution of derogatory bulletins; mimicking officers in stereotypical fashion and the use of racial, ethnic or religious slurs and humor." Id. at 1100.
91. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 1461; see also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"[r]epeated derogatory or humiliating statements ... can constitute a hostile work environment");
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[u]nfounded accusations
that a woman worker is a 'whore' . .. are capable of making the workplace unbearable...") (citations omitted).
93. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
94. Id. at 964; see also EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that calling plaintiff a whore and leaving a note on her desk with that word in big,
bold print represented a "sufficient quantum of harassment to constitute a hostile work environment"); Kulp v. Dick Horrigan VW, Inc., No. 93-5335, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 408, at *6, *10
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 1994) (finding that use of term "slut" and allegations of the denial of privileges met
essential pleading requirements); Cline v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923,
926-27, 932 (N.D. 111.1991) (holding that references such as "dyke," "dragon lady" and "syphilis"
coupled with physical contact of a non-sexual nature were prima facie evidence of sexual harassment).
95. Pornography, provided that it is does not meet the definition of obscenity, is protected
expression. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dep't, 865
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Shipyards, Inc.,9 6 a federal district court determined that subjecting the

plaintiff to pictures of nude and semi-nude women in the workplace, to
vulgar comments concerning women in general and her in particular, as
well as to sexually offensive jokes, 97 constituted the creation of a hostile
working environment. 9 8 While not all courts recognize this particularly
potent effect of words, 99 it does seem somewhat incongruous that, in at
least some jurisdictions, as society in general becomes more tolerant of
foul language and sexually explicit expression, 100 workplace norms are
becoming less tolerant l l as a matter offederal law. Is this the result inVII or, more importantly, a retended by Congress when it passed10 Title
2
sult permitted by the Constitution?

B. Conditions and Conduct
The overarching mandate of Title VII is that covered employers shall
not "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that private possession, reading and consensual sharing of Playboy magazine by firemen in living quarters is protected by the First Amendment).
96. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
97. Id. at 1493-1502. For a discussion of Robinson and its First Amendment implications, see
generally Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the FirstAmendment and the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403 (1991).
98. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding that
sexually derogatory terms and pornographic pictures contributed to a hostile work environment).
While a comprehensive study concludes that allegations of harassing posters, pinups and graffiti
occur in relatively few cases, when such incidents are directed at the plaintiff specifically or coupled
with other conduct, plaintiffs are successful in a substantial percentage of the cases. Juliano &
Schwab, supranote 56, at 567, 589.
99. See, e.g., Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that repeated use of term "sick bitch" was not a reasonable basis for a lawsuit);
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621-22 (6th Cir. 1986) (ruling that pornographic pictures and derogatory comments coupled with allegations of disparate treatment did not sustain plaintiffs burden in a Title VII claim).
100. Sexually explicit expression is indeed becoming more prolific, particularly with the introduction of the Internet. Clay Calvert, Regulating Sexual Images on the Web: Last Callfor Miller
Time, But New Issues Remain Untapped, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 507, 524 (2001). Larry
Flynt's recent introduction of "boutique" adult stores/cafes, such as "Hustler Hollywood," are demonstrative of such mainstreaming. Citysearch: Los Angeles, CA at
http://losangeles.citysearch.com/review/101550/editorial (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
101. See Frank, supra note 56, at 480 (arguing that harassment should be judged "by the standard of a reasonable person living in the profanity and sex-filled culture of the twenty-first century").
102. See Nadine Strossen, The Tensions Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the
First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 725 (1995) ("[H]arassment regulations
that falsely equate sexual expression with sexist harassment threaten both women's equality and
free speech.").
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terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."' 0 3 The critical issue is one
of disparate treatment, that is, whether persons encounter disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment because of certain illegal criteria. In
other words, "the essence of a Title VII case, including one based upon a
claim of.. harassment, is plaintiff's proof of actual discrimination."' 4 The
first case in which a court recognized a claim of harassment involved an
employer's segregation of Hispanic clientele. 10 5 The Fifth Circuit con06
cluded such segregation entitled the employee to statutory protection1
and found that the conduct was a sort of indirect violation of Title VII's
directive not "to limit, segregate, or classify... employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would... adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 0 7 Lately, it seems that courts first examine the environment, and if it is sufficiently hostile by whatever subjective criteria they
employ, the leap is then made to a presumption that there has been a
change in the conditions of employment. While the Supreme Court indeed recognizes that a sufficiently hostile atmosphere can result in a
change in the terms and conditions of employment, 10 8 the change must
be based upon disparate treatment. "[T]he test is not whether work has
been impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered."' 0 9 It is not sufficient that the atmospheric conditions are
overcast; there must be precipitation.
Plaintiffs should first clearly articulate the change in terms or condi0
tions of employment. For example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,"
the plaintiff was allegedly raped by her supervisor on several occasions and
fondled by him in the presence of others.' It is easy to conclude that being
forced to have sexual relations with one's supervisor over the course of
several years inherently affects the conditions of one's employment. " 2 The
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
104. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1253 (11 th Cir. 1999) (Edmondson, J., concurring).
105. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
106. Id. at 237-38.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
108. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also supra notes 31-41 and
accompanying text.
109. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
110. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
111. Id. at 60.
112. Under French law, sexual harassment is only recognized if a person uses their position of
authority to coerce a subordinate to engage in sexual relations; a recognized criminal wrong. Abigail
C. Saguy, Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence? Defining Sexual Harassment in American

and FrenchLaw, 34 LAW & Soc'y REv. 1091, 1092 (2000). While that narrow situation of civil liabil-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol21/iss2/10

18

Burke: Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consisten
2004]

Workplace Harassment

Supreme Court recognized the unique role that supervisors play in the
workplace and their ability to effectuate a change in the conditions of employment: "As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of [economic
harm] injury."' "13 Yet co-workers are sometimes cited as being the more
frequent source of workplace harassment claims." 4 While neither economic nor psychological injury is required for a Title VII violation in
workplace harassment cases, plaintiffs should start with the proposition
that they have been injured by a serious alteration in the terms and conditions of employment." 5 That conclusion is not as self-evident in co-worker
harassment cases.1 6 The decisions in both Faragherand Ellerth highlight
the critical importance of "tangible employment action"'17 in the context of
legal entity liability; the existence of less than tangible employment actions, or changes in other terms or conditions of employment, are no less
critical in other cases in which the economic axe has not yet fallen.
The Court in Faragherstated, with respect to workplace harassment
claims, "We have made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to
a change in the terms and conditions of employment, and the Courts of
Appeals have heeded this view."'' 18 The two decisions, which Justice
Souter cited as support for this proposition, involved situations in which
conduct allegedly precipitated a change in the conditions of employment.
In Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority,1" 9 a co-worker dropped
his pants in front of the female plaintiff, a supervisor touched and kissed
her without consent, and the district court found quid pro quo harassment
based upon the resulting loss of a tangible job benefit. 120 In Moylan v.

ity is not, nor perhaps should be, the limits of actionable conduct under American law, it does illuminate the inherent coerciveness of such actions and the inevitable change in conditions of employment.
113. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)
114. See Hager, supra note 42, at 377 n.4 (citing studies that indicate such results); Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Work-Related Sexual Harassment, 3 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 177 (1980). But see Juliano & Schwab, supra note 56, at 564 (arguing that most
harassers are supervisors in judicial opinions, which could be explained by the plaintiff's preselection assessment of the likelihood of success).
115. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 58, 65; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22

(1993).
116. Hager, supra note 42, at 389 (stating that "the distinction between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory harassment gets hopelessly muddled" because motivation for unpleasantness is elusive).
117. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
118. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (emphasis added).
119. 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
120. Id. at 572-74, 579.
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Maries County,1 2 1 the case in which the Eighth Circuit first recognized the
validity of hostile environment claims as a form of discrimination that vio122
lates Title VII, the plaintiff alleged that she was forcibly raped.
Assuming that there has been a change in the terms or conditions of
employment, the next critical inquiry by the plaintiff should be, "Why
me?" To answer this question for the purposes of establishing a Title VII
violation, proof of discriminatory animus in the differential treatment is required, 123 where conduct should be the focus of the proof. A review of the
workplace harassment claims considered by the Supreme Court highlights
the important role of conduct in the evaluation of the abusiveness of a hostile environment claim. While Meritorinvolved forced sexual relations, the
harassing conduct of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.124 was
no less severe. In Oncale, the plaintiff was physically assaulted in a sexual
manner and threatened with rape. 125 The plaintiff was also forcibly restrained while a co-worker put his penis on the victim's neck and pushed a
bar of soap into the victim's anus. 126 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court stated that Title VII "forbids only behavior so objectively of127
fensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."
Behavior, not words. Likewise, in Clark County School District v.
Breeden,' 28 the court's per curiam opinion noted that "Title VII forbids actions taken on the basis of sex that 'discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. ',129 Actions, not words. In Meritor, the Court cautioned that
"not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a
'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title
VII.' 130 Conduct, not words.
While the Supreme Court has never passed on the merits of any of the
hostile environment cases before it, all of them have involved allegations
of offensive conduct, though not necessarily as egregious as the behavior
complained of in Meritor and Oncale. In Ellerth, the plaintiff was threat-

121. 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 747-48, 749,750 (holding that the case should be remanded for consideration of the
hostile environment claim).
123. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
124. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
125. Id.at 77.
126. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
127. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added).
128. 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
129. Id. at 270 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)).
130. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
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ened with the denial of tangible job benefits and was subjected to touching
of a sexual nature to which she did not consent.13' In Faragher,the plaintiff was the subject of uninvited and offensive touching, aggressive physical contact, and threats of reprisal such as, "[D]ate me or clean the toilets
for a year."' 132 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 133 a supervisor suggested

that he and the plaintiff go to a hotel to negotiate her raise, asked her to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket, and asked her to pick up objects on
the ground in front of her after he threw them there.' 34 In a case of racial
harassment, National RailroadPassengerCorp. v. Morgan,'35 the plaintiff
alleged discriminatory acts such as termination for refusing to follow orders, a refusal to permit him to participate in an apprenticeship program,
written warnings for absenteeism, and the performance of racially derogatory acts. 1 36 Additionally, the managers allegedly directed racial epithets,
137
racial jokes, and racially negative comments toward the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, specifically ' noted,
38
"We make no judgment, however, on the merits of Morgan's claim."'
What place, then, do words have in the overall scheme of hostile environment litigation? Words can explain why certain behavior, conduct or
acts occur, and they provide some evidence of discriminatory animus. As
plaintiffs question the reasons for discriminatory treatment and changes in
the conditions of employment, derogatory references and epithets may help
to answer the question, "Why me?" As Justice O'Connor has observed,
"[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhapsprobative of.. harassment... cannot justify the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion
decisions were based on legitimate criteria."' 39 The primary focus, however, should be upon the actions directed at the plaintiff and whether they
have resulted in differential treatment based on illegal criteria. The Supreme Court in both Ellerth and Faragherkeyed employer supervisor liability on tangible employment actions, an endorsement of the importance
of disparate treatment. While a hostile environment can still be actionable
short of tangible employment actions, there should still be evidence of af131.
132.
133.

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1998).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780-83 (1998).
510 U.S. 17 (1993).

134. Id.at 19.
135. 536 U.S. 101 (2002), aff'g inpart,revg inpart, 232 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth
Circuit determined that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. Morgan, 232 F.3d at 1017.
136. 536 U.S. at 105 n..
137. Id.at 120.
138. Id. at 121 n.13.
139. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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firmative unequal treatment based upon forbidden criteria. 140 But words
should only illuminate why such actions were taken, and should not constitute a substantialfactor in the finding of a hostile working environment.
De-emphasizing the role that words play, and emphasizing the role that
conduct plays, should serve to preserve hostile working environment
claims under Title VII from legitimate constitutional challenges.
IV. A FIRST

AMENDMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DISTINCTION

Verbal expression has the power to offend, to ridicule, to berate and to
denigrate individuals. These unfortunate results attest to the power of
speech.' 4 1 Many commentators have addressed the issue of First Amendment violations with the regulation of workplace harassment under Title
VII and have discussed either the potential for conflict resulting therefrom 142 or the lack thereof.' 43 Because employers may suppress protected
140. For example, if minority employees are not afforded the same flexibility in scheduling
times for vacation or medical appointments as non-minority employees, then there exists evidence
of disparate treatment which affects terms and conditions of employment. Such treatment, however,
would presumably fall short of a tangible employment action.
141. As the Seventh Circuit observed in evaluating a local ordinance that attempted to suppress
violent pornography that objectified and subordinated women: "Yet this simply demonstrates the
power of pornography as speech. All of these unhappy effects depend on mental intermediation.
Pornography affects how people see the world, their fellows, and social relations. If pornography is
what pornography does, so is other speech." Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323,
329 (7th Cir. 1985).
142. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:Hostile-EnvironmentHarassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 510-12 (1991) (arguing that Title VII verbal harassment regulation is at odds with the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, The Constitution Under
Clinton: A CriticalAssessment: Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace,HarassmentLaw, and the Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 335 (2000) (opining that the harassing speech exception
must be properly addressed by the courts "to prevent its unchecked growth"); Olmstead, supra note 82,
at 692 (arguing that hostile environment harassment law is an unconstitutional application as it "applies
solely to speech"); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1863-66, 1871-72 (1992) (noting that actionable speech under harassment
law should be limited to expression directed at a specific victim by a harasser).
For an argument that the categories of protected speech and a sufficiently severe and pervasive hostile working environment are mutually exclusive, see John H. Marks, Title Vl's Flight Beyond First
Amendment Radar:A Yin-to-Yang Attenuation of "Speech" Incident to Discriminatory "Abuse" in the
Workplace, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,3-4 (1999) and John H. Marks, Title VI's Flight Within First
Amendment Radar: The Outer Cosmos of Employer Liabilityfor Workplace HarassmentAbsent a Tangibly DiscriminatoryEmployment Action, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1999). See also Cynthia L.
Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of DiscriminatoryHarassment, 75
TEX. L. REV. 687, 693-95 (1997) (characterizing workplace speech as a satellite domain of public discourse that demands a principled compromise between the values served by freedom of expression and
those of equality); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First
Amendment - Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757, 765-75 (1992) (discussing "the intersection
of free speech and equality concerns in the context of workplace sexual harassment...").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol21/iss2/10

22

Burke: Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consisten

2004]

Workplace Harassment

expression in order to comply with the vague mandates of Title VII har144
assment law, the statute has a chilling effect on the right to free speech.
Such a result is particularly predictable since employers will now attempt
to take advantage of the affirmative defense announced in Ellerth and
Faragher.145 For constitutional purposes, it makes no difference that the
result is dictated by the employer, who fears being sued for a Title VII violation, instead of directly through government censorship. 146 While sexually and racially harassing expression can certainly convey political
viewpoints, 147 the issue of suppression is exacerbated with respect to cases
of religious harassment because the First Amendment guarantee of religious freedom is also implicated. 148 This proposition, of course, presupposes that verbal harassment is, in fact, protected expression.
A. Verbal Harassment Under Title VII: Outside the FirstAmendment?
Certain categories of speech do not enjoy constitutional protection,
such as defamatory statements, 49 child pornography,' 50 and words that in143. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2295, 2298-301 (1999) (arguing that "collateral censorship" under Title VII is constitutionally permissible when there are good grounds for vicarious liability); Mark Oring & S. D. Hampton, When
Rights Collide: Hostile Work Environment vs. FirstAmendment Free Speech, 31 UWLA L. REv. 135,
161-62 (2000) (noting that the interest in equality outweighs that of free speech in the context of
harassment law); Ellen R. Peirce, Reconciling Sexual HarassmentSanctions and Free Speech Rights in
the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 127, 144 (1996) (noting that in certain well-defined circumstances, First Amendment rights must bow to the government's "compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in the workplace").
144. Frank, supra note 56, at 500-03; Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 80, at 841-42; Volokh,
supra note 86, at
12, 14, 16, 47, 69; Olmstead, supra note 81, at 695. Employers also may terminate an employee for engaging in what would seem to be protected expression. See Mackenzie v.
Miller Brewing Co., 608 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that plaintiff was terminated for recounting parts of an episode of "Seinfeld").
145. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
146. "One of our basic constitutional tenets, therefore, forbids the state to punish protected
speech, directly or indirectly, whether by criminal penalty or civil liability." Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1987). See Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the
Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 959, 970-71 (1998)
(stating that a First Amendment issue arises when a private employer defends restriction on speech
as being necessary to avoid Title VII liability). See also Pierce, supra note 143, at 131-33; Volokh,
supra note 84, at 637 n.32; Olmstead, supra note 82, at 697.
147. Pierce, supra note 143, at 158.
148. Frank, supra note 56, at 506-07. Moreover, religious speech is more likely to involve the
discussion of provocative ideas as opposed to attacking a person's characteristics, as is often the
case with racist or sexist speech. Berg, supra note 146, at 965. For a discussion of religious harassment, see infra notes 259-272 and accompanying text.
149. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (justifying a "negligence standard for private defamation actions"); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967) (noting
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cite imminent lawless activity.1 5 1 Courts in hostile. environment cases often
refer to the epithets and derogatory statements used as being "obscene,"
which is another form of unprotected expression. 152 However, the definition of obscenity in First Amendment law requires an appeal to the prurient
interest in sex,"5 3 so the reference in such a context is a misnomer. The
categories of unprotected expression that come closest to being relevant to
harassment claims are "threats" and "fighting words."
"True threats," objectively viewed in their total context, can be forbidden by statute.1 54 Since such threats are usually linked to criminal
conduct, 155 not civil liability, the argument that threats are unprotected in
the context of harassing speech does not make a perfectly fluid transition. 56 However, in the context of what is referred to as quid pro quo
sexual harassment, as distinguished from hostile environment cases,
there seems to be merit in the contention that there is no valid First
Amendment claim of protection just because words are used to intimidate an employee into succumbing without genuine consent to the sexual
overtures.157 'The" result wotld be the same with respect to any "true
threats," whatever the underlying rationale is for making the threat, be it
racial hatred or personal animosity.
In the context of hostile environment and verbal expression claims,
however, the exclusion of fighting words from First Amendment protec-

that there is a malice requirement for public figures); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (holding that "[t]he constitutional guarantees require... a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
her proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' .").
150. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (noting that "the States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children"). Cf Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (distinguishing Ferberand striking down a federal law
that would expand the category of prohibited expression by including virtual child pornography).
151. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). This category of speech, which can be
suppressed, seems to embrace situations involving crowd control as opposed to person-to-person
breaches of the peace.
152. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23, 39 (1973) (announcing a three-prong test to determine what is obscene).
153. Id.at 39.
154. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (holding that a statute which makes
a form of speech criminal must be interpreted with the First Amendment in mind).
155. A threat to kill the President may be punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2000). See
United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The First Amendment does not
guarantee a right to make intimidating threats against government witnesses.").
156. See Pierce, supra note 143, at 192 ("This theory does not appear to offer a satisfactory
rationale for making harassing speech exempt from the protection of the First Amendment.").
157. Strossen, supra note 102, at 704-05 (explaining that punishment of speech in quid pro
quo harassment raises no substantial First Amendment concerns).
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tion seems to be much more relevant.1 58 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,1 59 Mr. Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's witness, was convicted of violating
a law which prohibited persons in public places from addressing other
persons lawfully present by an offensive or derisive name with an intent
to deride, offend, or annoy. 60 He had been distributing literature on the
streets, a growing crowd was becoming restless, and a disturbance occurred.16 1 As Mr. Chaplinsky was being escorted to the police station, he
saw the city marshal and stated, "You are a God damned racketeer and a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists."1 62 In upholding Chaplinsky's conviction, the Court
stated,
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
"Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution,
and its punishment
as a criminal act would raise no question under that
63
instrument."
The Court seemed to emphasize the face-to-face context of the exchange
as being what the statute prohibited in an effort to prevent a breach of
the peace.' 64
It is far from clear whether the interpretation of Title VII has been
158. For an overview of the "fighting words" doctrine and a justification for the exclusion of
such words from the First Amendment based upon their relationship to conduct, see generally Aviva
0. Wertheimer, Note, The FirstAmendment Distinction Between Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting Words Jurisprudence,63 FORDHAM L. REV. 793

(1994).
159. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
160. Id. at 569.
161. Id. at 569-70.
162. Id. at 569 (internal quotations omitted). Mr. Chaplinsky admitted that he, in fact, made
this statement with the exception of using the name of God. Id. at 570.
163. Id. at 571-72 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
164. Id. at 573; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citing Choplinsky, 315
U.S. 568) ("[P]ersonally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.").
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limited to suppressing fighting words in violations based upon verbal
However, certainly some terms, such as "nigger" and
expression.
"cunt," ' 65 may constitute fighting words even though that category of
unprotected expression seems to suffer from the "But I know it when I
hear it" syndrome as well. 166 Nevertheless, assuming that Title VII verbal hostile environment cases are limited to fighting words used in direct
confrontations, there still exists a constitutional problem of considerable
magnitude.
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 67 the Supreme Court held that a city
ordinance, which banned the display of symbols (such a burning cross)
that could reasonably be known to arouse anger in others "on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender," is facially invalid under the
First Amendment' 68 The Court was bound by the limited interpretation
given to the ordinance by the state's supreme court, an interpretation that
narrowed its scope to fighting words.1 69 Nevertheless, the Court determined that while certain categories of speech, such as fighting words,
"can consistently 'with, the First Amendment, be regulated because of
their constitutionally proscribable content... they are [not] categories of
speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made
the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively
proscribable content.' 70 In other words, the government is not permitted
to pick and choose between fighting words, suppressing some but not
others depending upon their content; the "government may not regulate
use based on hostility--or favoritism-towards the underlying message
expressed."' 171 While content-based discrimination is permissible under
the exception noted in R.A. V., it must be "based on the very reasons why

165. Query whether foul names directed at women can constitute fighting words since sexist
speech does not usually trigger a violent reaction in most women. Pierce, supra note 143, at 187.
166. The Court has not illuminated just exactly what words are fighting words; however it discussed a state court interpretation in Chaplinsky: "The test is what men of common intelligence
would understand would be words.., and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting
words" when said without a disarming smile ....So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings."
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (citations omitted). However, they are not words that merely convey or
intend to convey disgrace, Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (citing Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972)). Nor are they "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace .. " Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-20 (citing GA. CODE ANN..§ 266303).
167. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
168. Id.at 391,393.
169. Id. at 381,391.
170. Id. at383-84.
171. Id. at 386.
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the particular class of speech at issue... is proscribable,"' 72 which, for
fighting words, is the likelihood of a breach of the peace.
Most recently the Supreme Court upheld a generic Virginia ban on cross burning, noting that, under the wording of the statute, "it does not matter
whether an individual bums a cross with intent to intimidate because of
the victim's 'political
the victim's race, gender, or religion, or because of; 174
homosexuality.'
or
membership,
union
affiliation,
In contrast, under Title VII, like the statute at issue in R.A. V., employers must censor only some fighting words on the basis of their content in order to avoid hostile environment lawsuits. For example, a
supervisor/co-worker could say exactly what Mr. Chaplinsky said (and
was convicted for saying) to an employee without fear of censorship because of the lack of discriminatory overtures. However, suppose instead
that the supervisor/co-worker said, "You are a God damned rag-head (or
camel jockey) and a damned Terrorist and all Muslims are Terrorists or
agents of Terrorists," perhaps with a few twenty-first century expletives
neatly inserted. What employer, who is well-adVisedby counsel, would
75
not take action against the speaker after a couple of such incidents?
Clearly Title VII hostile environment claims, even if limited to
fighting words, are content-based restrictions on speech 176 and should be
subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 177 As such, the classification of speech
172. Id. at 393.
173. Id. at 391. This exception has been referred to as the "special virulence exception to the
rule barring content-based subclasses of categorically proscribable expression ...... Virginia v.
Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1560 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Black
modifies another categorical exception noted in R.A. V. in which there is "no realistic possibility that
official suppression of ideas is afoot." Id. at 1561 (citing R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 390).
174. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1540. The Court determined that, factually, not all cross burnings
were directed at racial or religious minorities. Id. at 1546.
175. In 2003, the EEOC reached a $1.11 million settlement of a harassment suit in which four
plaintiffs claimed they were harassed because of their national origin (Pakistan) and religion (Islam). In addition to being ridiculed for their daily prayer obligations, each was called a "camel
jockey" and "raghead. " Pakistani-American Workers to Share $1.11 Million in HarassmentSettlement with Stockton Steel, EEOC, at http://eeoc.gov/press/3-19-03.html (Mar. 19, 2003).
176. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir.
1995) ("[W]hen Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims founded solely on verbal insults,
pictorial, or literary matter, the statute imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions
on speech.").
177. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 836 (2000) (invalidating a
regulation restricting transmission of sexually-explicit cable television programs); Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 874, 885 (1997) (holding that provisions of the Communications Decency Act that
regulated sexually-oriented materials on the internet, which were indecent but not obscene, were not
constitutionally valid); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (upholding a regulation prohibiting obscene commercial telephone messages); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 321, 329 (1988) (holding that a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum
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prohibited under Title VII is underinclusive under First Amendment law
because certain fighting words are censored (e.g., "spic") while others
are not (e.g., "fag"). 178 Even supposing that preventing discriminatory
verbal harassment constituted a compelling state interest under strict
scrutiny analysis, 179 it is still not clear that a ban, even with rather vague
parameters, is the least restrictive means of accomplishing this objective,
particularly when the cure for offensive speech has traditionally been rebuttal. As referenced in the introduction, successful efforts designed to
advance women and minorities into positions of true power in the workplace would tend to alleviate such antics in a more efficient manner than
for courts to censor name-calling based upon content. Perhaps Congress
could legitimately ban all fighting words as a means of preventing broad
intimidation in workplaces that sufficiently trigger the application of the
Commerce Clause, similar to Virginia's general ban on cross burning
with an intent to intimidate,18 but that is not the result Title VII harassment law is intended to accomplish.
Further, verbal hostile environment claims are not usually limited to
the recital of fighting words, but often include the expression of opinion
concerning the proper place for women, racial, and ethnic minorities in
the work force. This, of course, is more than just unflattering. 8' The offensiveness of such speech, which triggers the urge to suppress, is specifically linked to a disdain for the racist or sexist message expressed
and as such is a viewpoint-based restriction on expression.' 82 Statements
of opinion, however, are quintessentially protected speech, no matter
how pernicious, no matter how repulsive, no matter how objectionable
and no matter how unenlightened.183 Just ask Jerry Falwell. 18 4 As Justice
is inconsistent with the First Amendment).
178. Title VII has not been interpreted as applying to discrimination based upon sexual orientation.
179. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 134, 172-73 (1982) (arguing that an independent
tort action for racial insults is both constitutionally permissible and necessary even though it would
be a content regulation subject to exacting scrutiny).
180. Virginia's "Cross-Burning Statute," VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996), criminalizes expression not aimed at a particular group or out of specified prejudicial hatred. The Virginia
Supreme Court had struck down the statute as being an unconstitutional restraint on speech. Black
v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 746 (Va. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 538 U.S. 343
(2003).
181. The Sixth Circuit has stated that Title VII requires "that an employer take prompt action
to prevent such bigots ["Archie Bunkers"] from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or
offends their coworkers." Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
182. See Browne, supra note 142, at 491-501.
183. The Supreme Court recently reiterated the concept that ideas, however repulsive, are pro-
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Holmes once stated, "[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle
of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." 185 Similarly, Justice Thomas asserted
in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Avis Rent A CarSys., Inc. v.
Aguilar,
[A]ttaching liability to the utterance of words in the workplace is likely
invalid for the simple reason that this speech is fully protected speech.
No one claims that the words on the "exemplary list". . . qualify as
fighting words,... obscenity ....or some other category of speech

recognized as outside the scope of the First Amendment protection.
Even if these words do constitute so-called "low-value speech," the
content-based nature of [the] restriction... renders it invalid under our
current jurisprudence. To uphold the application of a content based
anti-discrimination law.., to pure speech in the' workplace, then, we
would 18have
to substantially modify our First Amendment jurispru6
dence.

Yet some might argue that Title VII's effect on workplace speech is
content neutral in targeted verbal abuse cases 8 7 or alternatively, no more
than a content neutral time, place, or manner restriction,188 focusing on
tected when it determined that the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 was unconstitutional
as applied to non-obscene child pornography that did not use real children. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240-58 (2002). See also Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323, 327-28, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that speech depicting the subordination of women is constitutionally protected), affd without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
184. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that the tort of outrageous
conduct is unavailable in a First Amendment context where the conduct was directed toward a public figure and the press).
185. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
186. Avis Rent -A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 529 U.S. 1138, 1140-41 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
187. Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The FirstAmendment Is Not Hostile to a
Content-NeutralHostile-Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 227, 259 (1996); see also Kent
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They ProtectedSpeech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 292-306
(1990) (supporting regulation of insults and epithets in face-to-face encounters even though they are
not content-neutral); Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
5, 49 (1990) (arguing that sexist speech can be regulated under federal statutes if it is made with
discriminatory intent, causes a direct discriminatory effect, or in situations wherein the listener constitutes a captive audience); Volokh, supra note 142, at 1871 (drawing the permissible line for regulating speech between that which is directed at a particular individual because of race, religion, sex,
or national origin, and undirected speech which indirectly offends). But see Browne, supra note
142, at 532 (creating a workable definition of targeted vilification is difficult).
188. Content neutral regulations attempt to direct the manner in which the speech is expressed,
and not judge its content. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736, 738 (1990) (ruling that regulation prohibiting solicitation on postal property passes constitutional muster). Some zoning ordi-
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workplace speech.' 89 In other words, since the intrusion is limited to
workplace speech, since employees have other outlets for expression,
since employees might be considered a "captive audience" for verbal invectives, or since speech in general may be regulated more for various
reasons in the workplace, regulation is permissible.' 90 Yet such excuses
ignore the reality that if one works forty hours a week and sleeps eight
hours a night, then over one-third of one's waking hours are spent at
work. 191 To limit the exercise of First Amendment rights of free speech
to the remaining two-thirds as a matter offederal law seems contrary to
the principles of democracy.1 92 Moreover, time, place, and manner restrictions must be content-neutral in order to be subjected to the lessexacting constitutional test, 93 and harassing speech is subject to sup-

nances, which address the secondary effects of sexually explicit speech or expression, fall into this
category. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429-30 (2002)
(holding that an ordinance prohibiting the operation of more than one adult entertainment business
in the same building survives summary judgment); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (upholding ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theatres from locating
within one thousand feet of any residential zone). An intermediate level of scrutiny is applied to
content neutral regulations that incidentally burden speech. The regulation is deemed constitutional
if its requirements are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, leaving ample
alternatives for alternate means of communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989). To be sufficiently tailored the regulation must not burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest, although the means chosen need
not be the least restrictive ones available. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662
(1994).
189. See Volokh, supra note 142, at 1819-43 (rejecting a broad workplace speech exception
that permits regulation under current constitutional jurisprudence). But see Oring & Hampton, supra
note 141, at 143 (stating that classification as such is problematic since harassment law is plainly
not content neutral).
190. See, e.g., Horton, supra note 97, at 418-23 (concluding that employees, for all practical
purposes, enjoy few speech fights in the workplace under state and federal law); McAuliffe, supra
note 82, at 254-55 (discussing cases noting the importance of the distinction); Cecilee Price-Huish,
"Because the ConstitutionRequires It and Because Justice Demands It ": Specific Speech Injunctive
Relieffor Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claims, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 193, 199-200
(1998) (arguing that the workplace warrants special protection for the victims of verbal harassment);
Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking FirstAmendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171, 197 (1990) (concluding that racist and sexist speech in a transactional
setting, such as the workplace, can be regulated).
191. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Many
employees spend the better part of their days and much of their evenings at work.").
192. The National Labor Relations Act recognizes the importance of free speech rights in the
workplace. See Eastex v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 556-57 (1978) (holding that communications between union and employees are protected).
193. "[R]easonable 'time, place and manner' regulations may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are permitted." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115
(1972) (holding that an anti-noise ordinance concerned with actual disruption of public schools is
permissible if it furthers the state's legitimate interest).
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pression specifically for its content, that is, the ideas it expresses.' 94 Further, whether the "captive audience" doctrine' 95 is applicable to the
workplace is seemingly a fact-intensive inquiry.' 96 Certainly some offended employees could avert their eyes or walk away. 197 Furthermore,
the captive audience doctrine has been applied to situations where there
islittle opportunity for retort,198 but that is not necessarily the case with
workplace harassers. Admittedly, employers can regulate workplace
speech; but what Title VII achieves is not just the regulation of employee speech, but employer speech as well, at least with respect to sexist and racist employers. Thus, it is not necessarily just the employees'
viewpoints which are censored, but potentially the employer's viewpoints as well. However, being bigoted and biased is permissible, so
long as those prejudices are not played out in the workplace.
B. Speech Incidentalto Conduct
First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes a speech/conduct dichotomy with respect to communication, particularly symbolic

194. Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values Collide in an Era of "'Political
Correctness": FirstAmendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 789, 803-04 (1995) (arguing that the use of Title VII to proscribe
speech on matters of public concern in hostile environment cases is an unconstitutional contentbased restriction).
195. The captive audience doctrine may serve to limit free speech rights when the intended
recipients of the message do not wish to receive it, and yet lack the freedom to avoid it. See, e.g.,
Kovacs v. Copper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949) (upholding a restriction on loud and raucous sound
trucks); Rowan v. United States. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970) (upholding a statute which allowed recipient of advertisements believed to be sexually provocative to instruct the
Post Office to direct the mailer to cease sending such advertisements).
196. See Balkin, supranote 143, at 2313 (stating that even if the realities of the workplace may
create captive-audience situations, that does not mean that the workplace should be a First Amendment-free zone); Berg, supra note 146, at 971-72 (opining that the captive audience doctrine alone
cannot justify restriction on speech unless it intrudes into a person's home); Browne, supra note
142, at 517-19 (arguing that the captive audience doctrine cannot justify Title VII's regulation of
workplace speech); Oring & Hampton, supra note 143, at 142-43 (stating that an extension of the
captive audience doctrine, which has largely been confined to one's home, to the workplace would
represent a vast expansion); Robbins, supra note 194, at 798 (arguing that the captive audience doctrine may be inapplicable to the workplace since the majority of Supreme Court justices have never
applied the theory outside the home environment).
197. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited the showing of nudity in certain drive-in movies); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 20-21 (1971) (reversing a conviction for wearing a jacket in a courthouse with the words
"fuck the draft").
198. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding an ordinance
which banned political advertising in public transit busses).
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speech. 199 The Supreme Court held in United States v. O'Brien211 that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms. 20 1 Therefore, as long as Title VII hostile
environment cases incidentally burden speech and are primarily aimed at
curbing discriminatory situations involving conduct, there should be no
constitutional problem.20 2 By the same token, if Title VII liability attaches primarily because of verbal expression, the regulation can hardly
be said to be "incidental" under O'Brien.20 3 In R.A.V., Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, stated that
since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not
against speech but against conduct. .. , a particular content-based subcategory of proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech...
Thus, for example, sexually derogatory "fighting words," among other
words, may produce a violation of Title VIi's general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices ....

199. While the distinction between speech and conduct is not of bold contrasts, it is arguably
clearer than what currently may be considered actionable harassment. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 402-03, 420 (1989) (holding that burning the flag is protected); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10, 414 (1974) (ruling that affixing peace symbol to American flag is protected activity); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505, 514 (1969)
(holding that wearing black arm bands in protest to the Vietnam war is protected).
200. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
201. Id. at 376. See Randall, supra note 90, at 1000-02 (arguing that the O'Brien test justifies
restriction on speech in hostile environment cases).
202. Randall, supra note 90, at 1000-01. In reality this result seems the norm, since a study of
Title VII sexual harassment cases revealed that "[s]uccessful cases are likely to involve sexualized
conduct directed at individual victims." Juliano & Schwab, supra note 56, at 549 (emphasis added).
203. Jeffrey A. Steele, Comment, Fighting the Devil with a Double-Edged Sword: Is the
Speech-Invoked Hostile Work Environment Hostile to O'Brien?, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 83, 139
(1994). See also Wertheimer, supra note 158, at 798 (discussing the speech/conduct distinction in
the context of the "fighting words" doctrine). But see 0. Lee Reed, The State Is Strong but I Am
Weak: Why the "'ImminentLawless Action '"StandardShould Not Apply to Targeted Speech That
Threatens Individuals with Violence, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 177, 196-97 (2000) (arguing that targeted
andthreatening intimidations may be "'brigaded' with conduct to such an extent that they are no
longer the 'pure speech' that the First Amendment protects").
204. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citations omitted). See also DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that conduct not targeted on the basis of its expressive content may be regulated with respect to sexually
derogatory "fighting words," but that does not mean that Title VII trumps First Amendment speech
rights).
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Likewise in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,20 5 the Court asserted by way of
example that Title VII was a content-neutral regulation of conduct.2 °6
This distinction, however, should not be a global one but rather a
fact-specific one. 207 In other words, just because Title VII in general is
aimed at discriminatory conduct, it does not mean that it is permissible
for violations to embrace situations which substantially involve speech.
That is, in order to violate Title VII, each alleged hostile environment
case should involve discriminatory conduct or treatment as the substantial factor. A permissible result for protected expression in such circumstances would be to provide evidence of discriminatory animus, and to
be persuasive in a finding of disparate treatment as well. It is not sufficient that Title VII is facially valid; it must be valid as applied as well.
As the Third Circuit stated in striking down a school district's antiharassment policy as being facially invalid in violation of the First
Amendment,
There is... no question that non-expressive, physically harassing conduct is entirely outside the ambit of the free speech clause. But there is
also no question that the free speech clause protects a wide variety of
speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including statements that impugn another's race or national origin or that denigrate
religious beliefs. When laws against harassment attempt to regulate
oral or written expression on such topics, however detestable the views
expressed may
be, we cannot turn a blind eye to the First Amendment
20 8
implications.
By regarding actionable conduct as the substantial factor in determining the severity and pervasiveness of the hostile environment, and by
requiring conduct rather than speech to be of primary importance in
evaluating the harassment, Title VII is properly aimed at discriminatory
treatment, and First Amendment values are preserved.2 °9

205. 508 U.S. 476 (1993). Mitchell involved a state statute that enhanced penalties for hate
crimes, which the Court characterized as being aimed at "conduct unprotected by the First Amendment." Id. at 487.
206. Id.
207. The test for determining whether conduct was sufficiently communicative is fact-specific,
based upon the actor's intent to convey a message and the likelihood that it would be understood by
those who viewed it. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974).
208. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
209. As Justice Douglas, a First Amendment absolutist, once noted, "Life in this crowded
modem technological world creates many offensive statements and many offensive deeds. There is
no protection against offensive ideas, only against offensive conduct." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 71 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Of course, it is permissible and preferable for employers to prohibit
the use of pejorative language, repulsive expletives, or hurtful epithets
on their own initiatives. 2 0 It is certainly desirable for employers to curb
harassing behavior and words in the workplace, even derogatory verbiage that is critical of sexual orientation, which currently is not embraced
by Title VII. But an employer policy establishing even a general civility
code is far different from federal law imposing a less exacting, but still
intolerably ambiguous, standard. Given the ambiguity that currently exists in what are perceived to be the parameters of actionable harassment
cases, it is critical that the Court etch a bright line, which hopefully will
center upon actionable conduct as being a substantialfactor in the creation of the hostile environment, with a keen eye to the resulting change
in conditions of employment. Such clarity is crucial because of the substantial resources being committed to the litigation of such claims2 1' and
the need for effective summary judgment filtering, particularly as this
theory of discrimination spreads to other statutes.
V. THE STANDARD AS APPLIED TO NON-SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION
The same standard, which has been developed in sexual harassment
cases, should translate into other Title VII harassment claims, 21 2 including
the entity liability standards announced in Ellerth and Faragher.21 3 Recently, however, courts have also extended the law of hostile environment
discrimination to other statutes such as the ADEA and the ADA. Yet,
would there be more or less likelihood of success in a hostile environment
case based upon age, disability, religion, national origin, or race, as opposed to sex, if the standard focused in substantialpart on conduct rather
than verbal expression? In other words, notwithstanding the potential for
soured romantic relationships between co-workers 21 4 and perhaps the
"greater potential for misunderstandings between men and women," 21 1 is
conduct more likely to be an inherent component of sexual hostile environment cases than in other types which may be created primarily through
verbal harassment? Is sexual touching and intimidation, though actionable,

210. Employers have the right to impose their own anti-harassment policies. Peirce, supra note
143, at 131 n.21. Cf Volokh, supra note 84, at 637 (stating that employers may, out of ignorance,
refuse to suppress harassing conduct leading to under-enforcement of Title Vii cases). Such a policy
choice would doubtless make the workplace more civilized and professional, and likely more productive. Beiner, supranote 12, at 134.
211. One study found that almost seventy percent of sexual harassment claims "only include a
hostile environment claim, while another 22.5% combine a hostile environment claim with a quid
pro quo claim." Juliano & Schwab, supra note 56, at 565.
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sufficiently subtle such that it is able to covertly exist in a workplace,
whereas conduct directed at other forms of discrimination is more overt
and less likely to be tolerated? 216 The next section will provide an overview
of other types of harassment cases by examining some illustrative examples.
A. ADEA Harassment
Some courts recognize hostile environment claims under the
ADEA,21 7 even though the 1993 proposed EEOC guidelines, which included not only the Title VII protected classes but age and disability as
well, were withdrawn and never formally adopted.2 18 In Crawford v.
Medina General Hospital,21 9 the Sixth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to give approval to such claims of discrimination based upon
212. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the same standards apply to both race-based and sex-based hostile environment claims).
Likewise, courts in sexual harassment cases have drawn upon standards developed in cases involving racial harassment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.l (1998). See generally
L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Ser in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819
(1997) (recognizing legitimacy in drawing analogies between race and sex hostile environment cases).
Cf Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me "Bitch "Just Don't Use the "N-Word". Some Thoughts on
Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rogers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997) (arguing that courts tend to resolve ambiguities in favor of
the claimant more in hostile environment cases involving race than those involving sex).
213. Wright, supra note 62, at 17, 22 (explaining that the decisions of Ellerth and Faragher
have been applied to racial discrimination cases as well as sexual harassment claims).
214. Hager, supra note 42, at 380; see also DENNIS M. POWERS, THE OFFICE ROMANCE 40
(1999) (examining in part the coalescence of the law of romance and the law of harassment).
215. Wright, supra note 62, at 30.
216. Judge Posner characterized sexual harassment as being largely "invisible" to persons other
than the victim and harasser. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 509 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner also noted that romantic encounters in the workplace often
begin well and then turn ugly. Id. at 513. Detecting the dynamics and nuances of such relationships,
which the parties desire to keep personal in some instances, is not easy, and, even in cases of rebuffed advances, not as obvious as racial and religious hostility.
217. For an overview of the statute's applicability to age discrimination claims, see Julie Vigil,
Expanding the Hostile Environment Theory to Cover Age Discrimination:How FarIs Too Far?, 23
PEPP. L. REv. 565 (1996). See also Margaret M. Gembala, Note, ADEA and the Hostile Work Environment Claim: Are the Circuit Courts Dragging Their Feet at the Expense of the HarassedOlder
Worker?, 7 ELDER L.J. 341, 345 (1999) (advocating universal acceptance of hostile environment
claims under the ADEA).
218. To examine the proposed guidelines, see Gembala, supra note 217, at 358-60. The potential effect on religious expression if the proposed guidelines were adopted proved to be the most
controversial. Id at 359-60. For an overview of the debate, see Russell S. Post, Note, The Serpentine Wall and the Serpent's Tongue: Rethinking the Religious HarassmentDebate, 83 VA. L. REV.
177 (1997).
219. 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996).
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age, although some district courts had previously adopted the theory in
age-based claims. 220 In affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant, the court held that "in light of the ADEA's
employment of the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' language, we have no doubt that a hostile work environment claim may be
stated.,

22 1

Other circuits, such as the Second, 222 Seventh, 223 Ninth, 224 and

Tenth 225

have hinted that such claims are cognizable under the ADEA.
Courts that recognize the viability of such claims tend to follow the
precedent established under Title VII. For example, in Burns v. AAFMcQuay, Inc.,226 the Fourth Circuit echoed what the Sixth Circuit announced in Crawford as the appropriate prima facie case:

220. Id. at 833-34. For some examples of district courts that have previously adopted this theory, see Eggleston v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 847 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (supporting
the viability of a hostile environment claim under the ADEA); Spence v. Md. Cas. Co., 803 F. Supp.
649, 671-72 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir. 1993) (assuming that a claim is available under the ADEA but not supportable on facts for respondeat superior liability); Drez v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that the statutory language
of the ADEA supports a hostile environment theory).
Some courts, in interpreting state or local civil rights acts in accordance with Title VII, have recognized such claims as well. See, e.g., Daka, Inc., v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 88 (D.C. 1998) (upholding
the jury's finding that an age-related hostile work environment existed under the D.C. Human
Rights Act); Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 667 A.2d 355, 359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995)
(adapting New Jersey's sexual harassment analysis to fit an age discrimination claim).
221. Crawford, 96 F.3d at 834.
222. Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the analysis for hostile environment is the same under Title VII and the ADEA); Hatter v. N.Y. Hous. Auth.,
165 F.3d 14, No. 97-9351, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27571, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 22 1998) (unpublished
opinion) (stating that damages are not recoverable under the ADEA even if plaintiff could establish
a hostile environment); Spence, 995 F.2d at 1158 (holding that because plaintiff could not point to
any evidence of harassment and the company tried to accommodate his disability, summary judgment dismissing his ADEA claim was proper).
223. Young v. Will County Dep't of Public Aid, 882 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant by applying Meritor). The appeals court stated that, while viable,
hostile work environment claims applied in the context of age discrimination are rare. Id.; see also
Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2001) (assuming that a hostile environment claim is viable under the ADEA, but finding no proof that alleged offensive conduct was discriminatory); Halloway v. Milwaukee County, 180 F.3d 820, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
there was insufficient evidence that alleged harassment was based upon age).
224. Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that violations of Title VII and the ADEA may be shown by proof of a hostile environment).
225. McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
age-related comments were merely stray remarks insufficient to establish pretext); see also Holmes
v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., No. 98-1172, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8710, at *21-*22 n.6 (10th
CiT. May 7, 1999) (assuming without deciding that a hostile environment claim could be advanced
under the ADEA).
226. 166 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 1999).
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In order to make out a claim for hostile environment under the ADEA,
Bums would be required to show (1) that she is at least 40 years old;
(2) that she was harassed based on her age; (3) that the harassment had
the effect of unreasonably interfering with her work, creating an environment that was both objectively and subjectively hostile or offensive; and 2(4) that she has some basis for imputing liability to her
employer.
The court concluded, however, that since the only comments attributed to the plaintiffs age were inquiries concerning her plans for retirement, a reference to her acting like a child, and perhaps a comment that
she did not fit in, she failed to provide sufficient evidence of a hostile
environment.2 28

Unfortunately, it seems that, like the Fourth Circuit, appeals courts
that have considered ADEA harassment claims have focused in substantial part on words being a pattern of conduct rather than the defendant's
actions, even though some claims have included allegations of disparate
treatment. For example, in Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher& Co. ,229 the
Eighth Circuit concluded that there was insufficient harassment on the
basis of age because there were only two specific comments made by
supervisors that related to her age which were not sufficiently derogatory
or demeaning. 230 In Rivera-Rodriguez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean,
Inc., 231 the First Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could find that
the plaintiff was subjected to a hostile working environment:
On six separate occasions, Frito Lay's president, its Latin American
Region President, and/or the Director Human Resources [sic] for the
Caribbean made seemingly derogatory, age-related statements about
Rivera. Because a question of fact exists over whether these comments
created a hostile work environment, the district court erred in granting
Judgment on Rivera's age-based, hostile-work-environment
Summary
23 2
claim.

227. Id. at 294.
228. Id. at 295.
229. 164 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999).
230. Id. at 1159. A supervisor allegedly inquired, "How much longer do you want to work?...
[W]e know you are old and you are not going to be here that much longer." Id. at 1155. Also, the
plaintiff claimed that she was called old enough to be someone's mother, that she was constantly
badgered about errors, inadequately trained, provided out-dated equipment, and improperly denied a
raise. Id.
231. 265 F.3d 15 (lstCir. 2001).
232. Id. at 25.
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Likewise, in EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, 33 the
Eleventh Circuit denied the defendant's appeal from a jury verdict on the
grounds that the evidence presented was insufficient as a matter of
law.2 34 In that case the plaintiff was regularly called, inter alia, "an old
fat bag," was told that she had "saggy, baggy boobs," and was asked
whether she was "having any hot-flashes." 235 While the verbal abuse was
arguably substantial, the only attendant conduct of which the plaintiff
complained was that her office was in a mess upon her return from vacafiles and mail strewn around, instead of stacked neatly on
tion "with 23new
6
her desk."
On the other hand, in Crawford,plaintiff alleged that several "old
age remarks" had been made by her supervisor and co-workers, including that "women over 55 should [not] be working," and that "old people
should be seen and not heard.

2 37

She further alleged that the office was

divided by age and that she had been excluded from certain functions.238
The appeals court determined that summary judgment for defendant was
appropriate because, aside from those remarks, there was little evidence
to suggest that hostility in the workplace was the product of age-based
bias. 23 9 More importantly, the court specifically noted that "Crawford's
complaints are of 'mere offensive utterance[s],' as opposed to physically
threatening or humiliating conduct., 240 If a bright line test established
liability for harassment based substantially upon conduct, with comments supplying the context for the behavior, none of these claims
should have succeeded. That is not to say that hostile behavior in the
workplace, which is directed at older workers because of their age, cannot occur. Indeed, that is precisely what the ADEA, if it is construed as
embracing harassment claims, should embrace. It should embrace disparaging remarks, however frequently they are uttered, and however repugnant they are to reasonable persons.

233. 117 F.3d 1244 (11 th Cir. 1997).
234. Id. at 1249.
235. Id. at 1247 n.2.
236. Id. at 1247-48.
237. Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 832, 836 (6th Cir. 1996).
238. Id. at 832-33.
239. Id. at 836.
240. Id. (alterations in original). The court also concluded that the social function from which
Crawford was excluded was not a term or condition of employment, and that she failed to show that
the alleged harassment impeded her work performance. Id.
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B. ADA Harassment
Courts are also recognizing the viability of hostile environment
claims under the ADA.24 1 The same analysis as that employed in Title
VII claims is utilized,242 although ADA causes of action exceed the aim
of Title VII by requiring a reasonable accommodation in certain situations, not just equal treatment.2 43 Although only two' circuit courts of appeals have expressly recognized the existence of such a claim, 244 several

district courts either presume it exists or recognize its existence. 245 Most
of the circuit courts have assumed without deciding that the ADA makes
hostile working environments actionable.246
241. See Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Structure of a Cause ofAction for Workplace Harassment Under-the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 1475, 1482-98 (1994). Congress has instructed that Rehabilitation Act analysis
be applied to ADA claims, and that courts have analyzed Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination claims using Title VII tests. Id. at 1491.
242. For example, in Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999) the court examined
threats of physical violence and verbal harassment directed at a police sergeant with sleep apnea. Id
In following the framework announced in Ellerth and Faragher,the court concluded that no tangible employment action had occurred to trigger the employer's liability for the harassment by a supervisor. Id.at 805-06. Further, in judging the totality of the circumstances the court concluded that
there had not been a change in employment conditions as a result of a severe and pervasive hostile
environment, relying in part on the responsiveness of the employer to complaints of co-worker harassment. Id. at 806-07.
243. For a discussion of the trend and an examination of the cases addressing the issue, see
Lisa Eichhom, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the Copy-andPaste Function, 77 WASH. L. REv. 575 (2002) (recognizing that this distinction may have ramifications for ADA hostile environment claims); see also S. Elizabeth Wilbom Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CoNN. L. REV. 603 (2001)
(arguing that some transmutation of Title VII analogy proves useful in ADA cases, but courts must
also appreciate the subtle differences between the types of discrimination).
244. See Marcia Coyle, New Toolfor Job Bias Suits: Two Circuits Say the ADA Covers Hostile
Work Environments, NAT'L L.J., May 14,2001, at Al.
245. See, e.g., Hiller v. Runyon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1023 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Johnson v. City
of Mason, 101 F. Supp. 2d 566, 577 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Vendetta v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. 97-4838,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14014, at *27-*28 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1998); Rodriguez v. Loctite P.R., Inc.,
967 F. Supp. 653, 662-63 (P.R. 1997); Hendler v. Intelecom U.S.A., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); Hudson v. Loretex Corp., No. 95-CV-844, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4320, at *6-*7
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997); Gray v. Ameritech Corp., 937 F. Supp. 762, 771 (N.D. I1. 1996); McClain
v. Southwest Steel Co., 940 F. Supp. 295, 301 (N.D. Okla. 1996); Fritz v. Mascotech Auto. Sys.
Group, 914 F. Supp. 1481, 1492 & n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F. Supp.
245, 252 n.9 (D.C. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F.
Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854, 860-861 (E.D.
Va. 1994).
246. See, e.g., Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
insufficient evidence of disability); Casper v. Gunite Corp., No. 99-3215, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
16241, at *12-*13 (7th Cir. July 11, 2000) (finding no evidence that alleged harassment was disability-based while noting that the cause of action nonetheless "appears" to exist); Conley v. Vill. of
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In Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services, Inc.,2 4 7 the
Fifth Circuit concluded that a claim for disability-based harassment is
cognizable under the ADA.248 The court further concluded that the plaintiff, who was HIV-positive, had presented sufficient evidence to support
249
In order to suc
the jury's finding of hostile environment harassment.
court deterclaim,
the
appeals
harassment
a
disability-based
ceed on
mined that the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment complained of was
based on her disability or disabilities; (4) that the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and
(5) that the employer knew or should have
250 known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt, remedial action.
Instead of proffering verbal abuse as evidence, the plaintiff, who
was discharged, relied primarily on claims of disparate treatment and
changes in her supervisor's attitude once she discovered that the plaintiff
was HIV-positive.25'

Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the actions taken were neither severe, pervasive, nor abusive); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n, 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999)
(asserting that the comments and actions complained of were not sufficiently severe or pervasive);
Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 725, 728 (8th Cit. 1999) (stressing that the obligation to make a reasonable accommodation does not extend to providing an aggravation-free environment, but declining to decide the cause of action question); Vollmert v. Wis. Dep't of Transp.,
197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that allegations of being berated and criticized fell well
below the requirements for a hostile environment); Wallin v. Minn. Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681,
688 (8th Cit. 1998) (holding that alleged incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive);
Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming the decision that the
facts failed to establish severe hostile en(,ironment); Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784,
788 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that the harassment argument was without merit while commenting
about whether the cause of action applies).
247. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001). For an examination of the case, see Melinda Slusser, Note,
Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services: A Step in the Right Direction,33 U. TOL. L. REV.
713 (2002).
248. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 235. Previously, in McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Corp., 131
F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit declined to recognize or reject an ADA cause of action
based on hostile environment. Id. at 563. However, the court stated that if it did recognize one, it
would be modeled after a Title VII harassment claim. Id. It thereby concluded that the plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action because the plaintiff only alleged remarks which were merely insensitive and rude, and not sufficiently hostile. Id. at 563-64.
249. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 236.
250. Id. at 235-36.
25 1. For example, after her status was discovered, she was subjected to increased random drug
tests, was written up repeatedly, and was twice placed on a 90-day probation. Id. at 237.
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252
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Fox v. General Motors Corp.

recognized the availability of a cause of action under the ADA for a hostile working environment 253 and placed more weight on plaintiffs evidence of verbal harassment.2 The plaintiff, who had requested an
accommodation for his limited physical abilities, was often berated with
coarse language by his supervisors, such as being called "handicapped
MFs," being asked "[h]ow in the F- do you take a S-H-I-T with these
restrictions?." and being referred to as one of the "911 hospital people. 255 More importantly, however, he was ostracized and segregated
with other disabled employees at the "light-duty table," placed at a table
that aggravated his back injury, and repeatedly requested to perform
tasks that he could not accomplish because of his injury.25 6 The court
upheld the jury's finding of a sufficiently severe and pervasive hostile
working environment, concluding that the evidence was "not of a few
isolated incidents of harsh language, teasing, or insensitivity, but rather
of regular verbal harassment and occasional physical harassment over a
period of nearly ten months directed at Fox because of his disability. '2 57
While the court characterized the conduct as merely "occasional,, 258 the
conduct element of this case could nevertheless be characterized as
"substantial" because of the physical harm thereby caused.
C. Religious Harassment
Like the ADA, Title VII has been interpreted to require employers
to refrain from discriminating on the basis of religion, and also to provide reasonable accommodation in certain circumstances for the practice
of religious observances. 259 There are two potential ways in which a hos-

252. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
253. Id at 176.
254. Id. at 179-80.
255. Id. at 173-74 (alteration in original).
256. Id. at 173. Such conduct, which partially resulted in physical harm, is akin to touching of
an offensive nature where consent has not been validly obtained.

257. Id.at 179.
258.

Id.

259. However, the burden on employers is less under Title VII than in ADA cases. The employer is required to make an accommodation so long as it does not result in undue hardship, defined as imposing no more than a de minimis cost. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 77 (1977) (holding that the employer made reasonable accommodations to the employee's
religious needs and that other alternatives amounted to undue hardship); see also Ansonia Bd. of
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) (holding that an employer does not have a duty to
accept an employee's suggestion for accommodation as long as it provides other reasonable means).
The EEOC Guidelines provide specific examples of accommodations in this context. 29 C.F.R. §
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tile environment can arise in discrimination cases based upon religion: 1)
by the same manner in which other such cases arise, that is, by creating
an abusive environment through pervasive ridicule and intimidation
based upon the religion of an employee 260 and/or 2) by a supervisor or
co-worker attempting to intimidate an employee into accepting religious
practices, that is, by overly-aggressive proselytizing. 26 1 In order to establish a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must show that s/he was subjected to harassment based upon religion, that the harassment was
subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and
that the employer knew of the harassment.26 2
With respect to the first category of hostile environments, some
courts have focused on the importance of verbal harassment in finding a
sufficiently abusive environment.263 For example, in Shanoff v. Illinois
Department of Human Services,26 the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff was subjected to six rather severe instances of harassment
by his supervisor over a four-month period, including anti-Semitic remarks and references to his ethnicity and religion made in an intimidat1605.2 (2003) (suggesting voluntary substitutes, flexible scheduling, and lateral transfers as options).
260. Often courts hold that the language does not rise to a pervasive level. See Freedman v.
MCI Telecomm. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that an alleged nasty attitude
by the supervisor coupled with a comment about a yarmulka is insufficient to establish an atmosphere of hostility); Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that the alleged
mocking of a Muslim greeting and contemptuous comments regarding plaintiffs faith did not
amount to discriminatory changes in employment, but rather were a form of simple teasing); Ngeunjuntr v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998) (declining to find discrimination
where alleged offensive comments about Buddhists were found to be isolated); Shabat v. Blue Cross
Blue Shield, No. 96-7638, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5133, at * 3-*4 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1997) (finding
that anti-Semitic incidents were relatively few and not objectively hostile); see also Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 577, 594-628 (1997) (discussing three potential types of hostile environment claims involving religion).
261. Examples include the daily broadcast of prayers over an intercom system and the placement of religious articles or verses in work-related documents, along with religiously-themed comments and criticisms of others not of the same persuasion. Volokh, supra note 84, at 630-31.
262. Featherstone v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No. 94-2331, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12518, at
*15 (4th Cir. May 23, 1995), accordRisinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp. 883 F.2d 475, 484
(6th Cir. 1990). However, some courts require that the harassment be pervasive and regular for religious discrimination rather than severe and pervasive. Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d
289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999).
263. See Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (finding that continuous anti-Semitic remarks and threats violated plaintiff's right to non-discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(finding that anti-Semitic verbal harassment and discharge is discriminatory based on religion).
264. 258 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2001).
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ing manner, in addition to allegations of disparate treatment based on the
same criteria, which were designed to hinder his career. 265 However,
verbal abuse is not always necessary for a finding of a hostile environment. In Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,266 the
plaintiff primarily alleged changes in the terms of her employment status
based on differential treatment because of her adherence to the tenets of
Orthodox Judaism, the totality of which resulted in a hostile working
environment.26 7
The second category of hostile working environments poses the
greater threat of a constitutional conflict because an employer may not
only censor the speech of an employee but also restrict an employee's
free exercise of religion.268 In Venters v. City of Delphi,2 69 the plaintiff
complained that her born-again supervisor, the police chief, continually
chastised her about repenting and abandoning an immoral lifestyle. 270 He
also threatened her with discharge if she did not mend what the chief
considered to be her sinful ways. 271 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
unabated lectures at work about her prospects for salvation, invasive inquiries into her personal life, and suggestions that she had sex with family members and animals, all delivered in an intimidating manner, could
265. Id. at 705-06. For example, the plaintiff was referred to as a "haughty Jew" and told by
his supervisor that she knew "how to put you Jews in your place." Id. at 698-99.
266. 260 F.3d265 (3dCir. 2001).
267. Id. at 267, 279 (reversing summary judgment for the defendant on the religious harassment claim).
268. See Kimball E. Gilmer & Jeffrey M. Anderson, Zero Tolerancefor God?: Religious Expression in the Workplace After Ellerth and Faragher, 42 How. L.J. 327, 339-40, 341-45 (1999) (discussing
the tension between Title VII's anti-harassment protection and the constitutional guarantee of the free
exercise of religion); Josh Schopf, Religious Activity and Proselytization in the Workplace: The Murky
Line Between Healthy Expression and Unlawful Harassment,31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 40,49,
52 (1997) (examining the tension between freedom of speech and religion, the right to be free from harassment with respect to proselytizing, and the need for legislative clarification).
Employers, out of fear of Title VII litigation, may suppress the expression of religious viewpoints in
addition to other messages that might be suggestive of verbal harassment in violation of First
Amendment rights. Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile Work Environment: The Challengeof Balancing Competing FundamentalRights, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 81,
85, 102-03, 106-07 (2000-2001) (examining the conflict between the right to religious expression and
the right to be free from workplace harassment). In cases that involve a governmental employer, the
clash is indeed heightened. See, e.g:, Tucker v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1209-1211 (9th
Cir. 1996) (invalidating an order banning religious advocacy in the workplace as unconstitutionally
broad); Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that an employer's directives to cease religious activities, such as morning prayer, and to remove a Bible from an employee's desk are discriminatory unless it can be shown that the activities caused disruption or
interference of the work environment).
269. 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997).
270. Id. at 962-63.
271. Id. The plaintiff was ultimately discharged. Id.
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constitute a type of quid pro quo harassment in which employees are
forced to adhere to a set of religious values or otherwise face termination.27 2 Interestingly, the quid pro quo situation did not seem to embrace
discrimination because of the complaining employee's religion (none
was ever mentioned) in the same manner that quid pro quo harassment
occurs because of sex; thus, it is not clear how this same principle translates into alleged harassment resulting from proselytizing. At any rate,
while disparate treatment can certainly occur because of religion, and
supposedly hostile conduct can be directed at employees because of their
religion, it is likely that words will be used to establish the connection.
To the extent that verbal expression explains anti-religious animus, there
should be no problem. However, to establish liability based upon prolific
insults and remarks about an employee's religious preferences, instead
of conduct, is, problematic.
D. NationalOrigin Harassment
Discrimination based upon national origin is actionable under Title
VII, and the creation of a hostile working environment is clearly recognized as a form of discrimination.27 3 The EEOC Guidelines specify that
"employers have an affirmative duty to maintain a working environment
free of harassment on the basis of national origin., 274 They further provide,
Ethnic slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individual's national origin constitute harassment when this conduct: (1)
Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment; (2) has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance; or (3)
275otherwise
adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
Since harassment is constituted by either verbal or physical conduct, the guidelines permit the finding of a hostile environment based
272. Id. at 976. Cf Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1337-39, 1341-42
(8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the termination of an employee for refising to cover a graphic antiabortion button during work did not violate Title VII because the employer offered a reasonable
accommodation).
273. Oftentimes hostile environment claims based upon national origin will overlap race-based
claims as well.
274.

29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(a) (2003).

275. Id § 1606.8(b). The guidelines further specify that the employer can be responsible for
the harassment of co-workers and non-employees if they knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. Id. § 1606.8(d), (e).
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276
upon verbal expression, which has been validated in court decisions.
For example, in affirming a jury award of compensatory and punitive
damages in Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc.,277 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that a jury could reasonably find that frequent name-calling
and hurling of ethnic slurs, coupled with the use of derogatory names in
an intimidating manner, could have interfered with the plaintiffs job
2 79
performance. 278 Similarly, in McCowan v. All-Star Maintenance,Inc.,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant based upon the repeated use of slurs and verbal
abuse, some with racial and ethnic overtures, over a three-week period
of employment. 280 However, for the environment to be actionable, the
incidents of national origin slurs should be more than occasional or sporadic.281
Of course, not all national origin harassment cases focus on verbal
abuse. In Kang v. U.Lim America, Inc.,282 a Korean-American was subjected to constant tongue-lashings in addition to physical abuse. 283 The
employer allegedly kicked the plaintiff, made him do jumping jacks, and
threw a variety of objects at him, including metal ashtrays, calculators,
water bottles, and files.28 4 Likewise in Cerros v. Steel Technologies,2 85
the plaintiffs tires were slashed while he was at work, he was allegedly

276. Ziv v. Valley Beth Shalom, No. 97-55357, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18847, at *4 (9th Cir.
Aug. 11, 1998) (finding that the use of slurs is sufficient to state a claim of hostile environment).
But see Filipovic v. K & R Express Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (determining that
four ethnic slurs made over the course of a year were part of the normal dock environment and insufficient to constitute a hostile environment).
277. 277 F.3d 1269(11th Cir. 2002).
278. Id. at 1276-77. The plaintiff was given several nicknames including "Julio," "Chico," and
"Taco," in addition to being called "Wetback," "Spic," and "Mexican Mother F-." Id. at 1273.
279. 273 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2001).
280. Id. at 923-24, 927. Crew leaders referred to the plaintiffs collectively and individually by
a litany of offensive terms, including "cholo-attitude motherfuckers," "nigger," "spik," "a bunch of
burrito-eating motherfuckers," and "stupid, fucking Mexican." Id,at 923-24.
281. See Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that one incident involving the use of derogatory language, which that was not racially charged, did not constitute discrimination, though the plaintiff was allowed to use it as evidence of discriminatory intent).
282. 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2002).
283. Id. at 814. The defendant, who was also Korean, called the plaintiff "stupid," "jerk," "son
of a bitch," and "asshole." Id.
284. Id. The Korean employer singled out Korean workers for such relentless abuse because he
expected them to work harder as Koreans, unlike the Mexicans and Americans, who the employer
claimed were not hard-workers. Id. at 817. The court ruled that, under these facts, the case was precluded from summary judgment. Id. at 820.
285. 288 F.3d 1040 (7thCir. 2001).
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reprovided training inferior to that given to white employees, and was
286
ferred to as "brown boy," "spic," "wetback," "Julio," and "Javier."
Yet conduct, or disparate treatment, plus verbal abuse are not necessarily sufficient to state a cause of action for a hostile working environment in all circumstances. In one case involving a mixture of racially
offensive slurs, an offensive cartoon, and allegations of disparate treatment, the Ninth Circuit held as a matter of law that there was no hostile
environment.2 87 While national origin harassment cases, like others, still
seem to be a question of degree, it is clear that abusive environments
caused by intimidating conduct can occur in these cases. Unfortunately,
it is also clear that verbal abuse alone sometimes suffices.
E. RacialHarassment
There is much more case law on racial harassment than the other
non-sex based forms of harassment, and it is fairly clear that hostile
work environment claims based upon racial harassment should be reviewed by the same standard as those based on sexual harassment. 288 It
is also clear that verbal abuse is sufficient for a finding of harassment in
many jurisdictions, and that egregious conduct often times accompanies
verbal assaults, as do intimidating threats of violence and allegations of
disparate treatment. In cases of verbal harassment, many jurisdictions
require something akin to a "steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment" 289 or a working environment dominated by racial slurs, jokes, and
286. Id. at 1042-43. Racist graffiti proclaiming "KKK" and "White Power" was scrawled on
the bathroom wall as well, along with a suggestion that the plaintiff go back to Mexico. Id.; see also
Jeremiah v. Yankee Machine Shop, Inc., 953 P.2d 992, 994-95, 998 (Idaho 1998) (affirming the
jury verdict for the Romanian plaintiff on his hostile environment claim, where he had been subjected to name-calling and physical threats, had his truck scratched, his tires deflated, and was
locked in the phone cabin).
287. Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1031, 1034, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1990); see
also Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that allegedly
harassing incidents, only two of which contained racially-related epithets, along with some complaints of disparate treatment, are insufficient as a matter of law to create a hostile environment);
Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, 931 F.2d 1379, 1385 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming the lower
court's conclusion that complaints of disparate treatment coupled with derogatory comments were
insufficient to establish a hostile environment).
288. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.l (1998); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); see also Wright-Simmons v. City of Okla. City, 155 F.3d 1264
(10th Cir. 1998) (applying Faragherand Ellerth to a racial harassment claim). For an argument that
Faragherand Ellerth should apply to non-sexual harassment Title VII claims as well, see Debra
Domenick, Comment, Title VII: How Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual HarassmentApply
with EqualForce to Claims of RacialHarassment, 103 DICK. L. REv. 765 (1999).
289. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981).
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innuendo. 290 For example, in Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 291 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a back-pay award for the plain-

tiff who had been regularly exposed to insults and racial epithets at the
hand of his supervisor, and on one occasion was told, "You black guys
are too fucking dumb to be insurance agents. 292 The court of appeals
observed,
Perhaps no single act can more quickly "alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment," than the use of
an unambiguously racial epithet such as "nigger" by a supervisor in the
presence of his subordinates. The fact that black employees also may
have spoken the term "nigger" does not mitigate the harm... a superthe work environment far more sevisor's use of the term impacts
2 93
verely than use by co-equals.
More recently, in Swinton v. Potomac Corp.,2 94 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a one-million dollar punitive damage award; the court determined that the plaintiff, who was subjected to repeated jokes by coworkers using the word "nigger," "Zulu Warrior," and other snide, racially-biased comments, was the victim of a hostile working environment.295 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that summary judgment
was inappropriate in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that he had
290. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that ten racially
hostile incidents over a twenty-month period were sufficient to sustain a claim of hostile work environment); see also Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing summary
judgment for the employer and concluding that references to plaintiffs as slaves and monkeys, derisive remarks concerning their African heritage, offensive references to their hair, and the use of the
term "nigger" created questions of fact regarding the existence of a hostile working environment).
But see Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 549-51 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that racial slurs and
jokes along with expelled flatus were insufficient absent more proof of racial animus).
291. 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
292. Id. at 671. The plaintiff was only subjected to one objectionable act in addition to the verbal abuse: the supervisor emptied the contents of his desk drawers onto the desktop when searching
for something. Id.
293. Id. at 675 (citations omitted) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)). The supervisor also called the plaintiff "Rabbit," short for "jackrabbit," an apparent reference to his Black Southern heritage. Id. at 676.
294. 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001).
295. Id. at 799-800, 819-20. Likewise, in EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1067
(1 1th Cir. 1990), the appeals court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the managers' racially
hostile remarks were sufficiently frequent and denigrating to be actionable. Id. at 1070. The racial
insults consisted of terms such as "ignorant niggers" and "Swahilis," along with assertions that
"blacks were meant to be slaves" and were of inferior intelligence. Id. at 1068 n.3. See also
Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 433, 439 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
summary judgment was inappropriate where the supervisor referred to African-Americans as "apes
or baboons," "niggers," "spooks," and "Buckwheats").
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been subjected to incessant racial slurs, insults, and epithets by his employer, as had been his employer's wife, who, oddly enough, was also
African-American. 9 6 While a single incident or remark will not usually
trigger liability, 297 in some cases, an isolated occurrence, if severe, will
suffice.298
More often than not, however, racial harassment claims will allege
the coalescence of a pattern of racist conduct, including verbal insults,
threats and discriminatory treatment. Often times, intimidating symbolic
expression can set the tone for the harassing environment. 299 For example, in Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc.,300 in addition to being called
"Buckwheat" and having to endure racist jokes, the plaintiff was also the
subject of intimidating threats and harassing conduct. 0 ' Additionally, a
co-worker threatened to injure his young son, and a human-size dummy
with a black head was
hung in the doorway with what appeared to be
302
blood dripping on it.
296. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 182, 191 (4th Cir. 2001).
297. Ross v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 293 F.3d 1041,1050-51 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a "one-time incident, while offensive, does not rise to the level of harassment necessary to
prove a hostile environment"); Butler v. Fed. Whalen Moving & Storage, L.L.C., No. 00-2876,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 302, at *5, *6 (7th Cir. Jan. 4, 2001) (holding that "a single isolated remark
normally does not create a hostile work environment"); Blocker v. Avondale Mills, Inc., No. 982582, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18663 at *6, *7 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (holding that a jury could
have reasonably found that "racially-charged language" including "notes carrying such messages as
'N-, go home,' and 'We don't like your kind' did not create a hostile work environment); Clayton
v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a "single incident" is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a Title VII violation); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that "incidents that were essentially occasional and incidental" were insufficient to maintain a Title VII claim).
298. See supra notes 65-66, and accompanying text.
299. See EEOC ChairwomanResponds to Surge of Workplace Noose Incidents at NAACP Annual Convention, EEOC, at http://eeoc.gov/press/7-13-00-b.html (July 13, 2000) (stating that the
incidents of nooses being hung in the workplace increased in the late 1990s).
300. 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991).
301. Id. at 1266-67. Graffiti with the initials "KKK" and the slogan "all niggers must die"
were scrawled on the bathroom walls. Id. at 1266. A bullet was shot into his home, although he
could not prove that a co-worker had fired it. Id. at 1267.
302. Id. at 1266, 1267. The backpay award and award of attorneys' fees was affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1266. See Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, 343, 345-46
(7th Cir. 1999) (holding that there was insufficient proof of discriminatory motivation even where
the employer referred to plaintiff and others as "stupid black bitches," "stupid niggers," and "black
cunts"); Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1506, 1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1989) (confirming that a noose found hanging from the light fixture above plaintiffs work station on two occasions provided sufficient evidence to support jury's verdict for plaintiff); Snell v. Suffolk County,
782 F.2d 1094, 1096, 1098, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming that racial epithets, slurs, derogatory
literature, and harassing conduct deprived appelles of their Title VII rights). However, is it is not
always clear where the line should be drawn. See Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 92425 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding rather extreme pranks and epithets insufficient to show Title VII viola-
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It is also not uncommon for allegations of disparate treatment to accompany verbal abuse in an alleged hostile environment based upon

race. For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld a punitive damages award
of $50,000 in a case where an African-American was treated differently
than similarly situated white employees, and was also called racist

names and subjected to racist comments. 0 3 In a case of reverse racial
harassment, the only white officer in a precinct successfully survived a
motion for summary judgment for his claim that he was the victim of a
hostile environment because he faced ridicule, was called "honkey," and

was unfairly treated with respect to promotion and work requirements. 304
Unfortunately, it sometimes seems that courts almost view the instances
of disparate treatment as being distinct from the claim of a hostile environment, when all claims of unequal treatment and harassing conduct
should be considered in determining whether Title VII has been violated.30 5
Such a coalescence of proof is exhibited by Jackson v. Quanex
Corp.,30 6 a case in which the plaintiff was subjected to racial slurs, racist
graffiti, offensive conduct (such as the hanging of a "Black-O' Lantern"
near his work station), and different treatment with respect to the enforcement of company rules and the availability of training opportunities. 30 7 In another case described as "not a case on the cusp" but "well
over the edge," the hospital staff plaintiffs endured dozens of derogatory
tion).
303. Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 130 F.3d 349, 352-53, 356-57, 359 (8th Cir. 1997); see
also Allen v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 410-13 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant in a case involving racial slurs and insults, a harassing note, claims of unwarranted disciplinary action, and unusual monitoring); Gachot v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep't,
No. 94-2020, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2275 at *2, *3, *6 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 1995) (affirming jury
award in case involving racial epithets and jokes coupled with evidence of being treated differently
with respect to working conditions).
304. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 237, 242 (5th Cir. 1998).
305. For example, in Lattimore v. PolaroidCorp., 99 F.3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996) the appeals court
cryptically announced,
Hostile environment harassment is readily distinguishable from "job status" discrimination, another type of employment discrimination that occurs when action is taken that
adversely affects an employee's job status, remuneration or benefits and it is based upon
the employee's membership in a protected class. Thus, when both harassment and "job
status" discrimination claims are made, they are analyzed separately. A job status discrimination claim is not converted into a harassment claim simply because it is labeled
as such.
Id. at 463 (citations omitted). Seemingly, hostile environment cases represent examples of disparate
treatment; therefore, all instances of disparate treatment should be probative as to the ultimate issue.
306. 191 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 1999).
307. Id. at 651-54. In Jackson, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 659.
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statements by the head of their department, who would also push and
pull the plaintiffs down hallways and throw objects at them.3 °8 In the
presence of the plaintiffs, the doctor would not touch Latino patients
without gloves and would not touch African-American patients at all.30 9
In these latter two cases it seems clear that the harassing conduct was a
substantial factor in the creation of a hostile working environment, there
was evidence that conditions of employment were affected, and the verbal abuse explains why the plaintiffs were treated in such a manner.
Cases of racial harassment seem to involve conduct as a substantial factor in the creation of a hostile working environment more so than other
non-sex-based claims. Unfortunately, they also seem to be more likely to
succeed in those cases involving only verbal abuse.31 °
VI. CONCLUSION

In sum, it seems more than odd that federal appeals courts concentrate so hard on how many times and over how long a time period an
employee might be called a nasty name before upholding a substantial
award of punitive damages. What happened to the old saying, "Sticks
and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me?" It is apparently inapplicable in many jurisdictions to civil rights litigation,
where instead the saying should be revised to proclaim, "Sticks and
stones may break my bones, but words can get me a fairly sizeable damage award, too." The threat of a million-dollar damage award, coupled
with the affirmative defense provided under Faragherand Ellerth, will
inspire many employers to censor workplace speech, and that is simply
not permissible under the Constitution. It often defies reason that unenlightened persons say what they do to others in the workplace; they
are certainly rude, obnoxious and absolutely not politically correct. But
it has not been politically correct to censor speech for over two hundred
years, either. Let the employer regulate such offensive utterances, and let
the offended respond as well. Alternatively, let legislators prohibit all
fighting words and intimidating threats, and not just the categories targeted by civil rights legislation, should the electorate so desire.
Currently, however, as complaints of workplace harassment con308. Nieto v. Kapoor, 268 F.3d 1208, 1212-14, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming $3.75 million
damage award).
309. Id. at 1213.
310. See Gregory, supranote 210, at 748-50 (stating that while courts assert that racial epithets
used in a few occasions can be found actionable, the courts seem to be less generous with such assertions in sex cases).
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tinue to provide fertile ground for civil rights litigation, it seems hopelessly unclear how hostile is hostile in harassment cases. Conduct can be
more intimidating, threatening and offensive than words; moreover,
conduct as a form of expression is less protected than pure speech under
the First Amendment and can also form the basis of an action in tort or
under criminal law. If courts applied a test for hostile environment complaints, which focused on conduct as the substantial factor in finding an
actionable environment with verbal expression providing the evidence of
discriminatory bias, results would be more predictable and less protected
expression would be censored.
While the hallmark offensive element of sexual harassment cases is
often touching of a sexual nature to which consent has not been given,
other forms of harassment can also involve sufficiently offensive conduct coupled with verbal expression. In workplace harassment cases, intimidating threats and sustainable allegations of disparate treatment
usually accompany verbal harzssment as well. It is the threats, the specific proof of situations involving disparate treatment, and the severity
and pervasiveness of the abusive conduct that should be evaluated for
employer liability, not just what epithets are spoken, what jokes are told,
or what derogatory phrases are uttered. Ultimately, if such a bright-line
test is applied, even though hostile environments involving conduct plus
words exist in non-sex-based harassment claims, it seems plausible that
more non-sex-based claims would be filtered out than sex-based claims
because of the almost inherent compliment between touching and words
in such cases (though not the non-sexual gender-based claims of harassment). But that hypothesis will remain untested as long as courts continue to count words (literally) as a critical component in the finding of
workplace harassment.
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